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1Summary
Developments in digital technologies over the 
last thirty years have expanded massively human 
beings’ capacity to communicate across time and 
space (Section 1). Media infrastructures have si-
multaneously acquired huge complexity. By “me-
dia” we mean technologies for the production, 
dissemination, and reception of communication, 
but also the contents distributed through those 
technologies and the institutions associated with 
their production, dissemination, and reception. 
The relations between media, communications, 
and social progress are complex. More peo-
ple can now make meaning and be connected 
through media, providing an important resource 
for new movements for justice and social prog-
ress. Meanwhile the uneven distribution of op-
portunities to access and use media is itself a di-
mension of social justice. 
 
Media infrastructures, and media access, have 
spread unevenly (Section 2), and media’s con-
sequences for social progress cannot be deter-
mined at a general level. Traditional and digital 
media have developed according to distinctive 
histories across the world (2.1), with varying 
marketization and state control (case studies on 
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2China, Russia, Sweden, South Africa, Indonesia, 
and Mexico: 2.2). Inequalities of access to media 
infrastructures (2.3) are stark, between and with-
in regions and inside countries, with implications 
for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Cultural flows through media vary greatly within 
and between regions (2.4). 
Meanwhile (2.5) people’s increasing dependence 
on an online infrastructure that mediates daily 
life increases the importance of the corporations, 
which provide that infrastructure. This has trans-
formed the governance of media infrastructures 
(Section 3), with a shift from formal to infor-
mal governance and the growing importance of 
transnational governance institutions and prac-
tices, whereby corporations, not states, exercise 
predominant influence (3.2), including through 
the operations of algorithms, with ambiguous 
implications for corporate power and individual 
rights, for the public sphere and for social prog-
ress (3.3). 
Journalism has for centuries been a key institu-
tional form for disseminating public knowledge, 
and so contributing to social progress (Section 
4). While digital technologies have expanded 
who can do journalism (see 4.5 on citizens’ me-
dia), other aspects of digitization have under-
mined the economics of public journalism (4.3), 
with new threats to journalists from growing 
political instability (4.4). Even so, there are new 
voices within global journalism (4.6 on TeleSUR 
and Al-Jazeera). 
The increasing networking of communications 
changes citizenship too, as citizens find infor-
mation, develop imaginative loyalties and make 
practical connections beyond national borders, 
not only within the Global North (Section 5) 
and with particular implications for global youth 
(5.2). A more “connected” life is however not 
simply “better” (see 5.3’s case study of life in a 
Chinese heritage village and 5.4 on the me-
dia-based oppression and resistance of precari-
ous workers in East Asia). 
Struggles for social justice through the democ-
ratization of media (Section 6) have acquired 
new prominence, echoing previous struggles 
(6.1) and foregrounding the transparency and 
accountability of media infrastructures, and data 
flows in particular, (6.2), with implications for 
the SDGs and Social Progress Index (SPI). Con-
cerns include net neutrality, Internet freedom, 
algorithms’ discriminatory operations, and the 
automated surveillance on which most online 
businesses now rely. There are implications for 
state and corporate power (6.5) which civil soci-
ety has challenged (6.4 on India and Facebook’s 
Free Basics). A bold new model of Internet gov-
ernance has emerged in Brazil (6.6 on Marco 
Civil). 
Yet media remain the channel through which 
many struggles for social progress are pursued 
(Section 7). An important example of innovative 
media use for social progress was the Zapatis-
tas in Mexico (7.1), but social movements’ uses 
of media technologies have taken many forms 
across the world, exposing important constraints 
(7.2). Since old media generally do not disappear 
but are linked up in new ways through digital 
media, it is overall ecologies of media resource 
on which movements that struggle for social 
progress have drawn (7.3), with struggles against 
the injustices faced by disabled people being an 
example of the creative use of media resources 
(7.4). 
Effective access to media is a necessary compo-
nent of social justice (Section 8). But media’s 
consequences for social progress are complicated 
by uneven media access, the plurality of spaces 
3where people connect through media, and the 
multiple uses of communication resources (hate 
speech is enabled by the Internet too). The SPI 
should measure the distribution of opportunities 
for effective media access and use, and address 
communication rights. Media infrastructures 
are a common good whose governance should 
be open to democratic participation. Concerns 
about automated surveillance and the environ-
mental costs of digital waste must also be ad-
dressed. Our action plan and toolkit list various 
measures to these ends. 
Media’s role in social change, and potentially so-
cial progress, is often assumed, rather than fully 
investigated. “Media” are inherently complex, in 
themselves and in their consequences. By “me-
dia” we mean primarily technologies for the pro-
duction, dissemination and reception of commu-
nications, but (in accordance with the common 
usage of the word “media” and its equivalents in 
many languages) we include also contents dis-
tributed through those technologies and the in-
stitutions associated with their production, dis-
semination, and reception. By “social progress,” 
we refer to the development of societies towards 
the progressive enablement of human beings to 
fulfil their needs and capabilities (Sen 1999; Sti-
glitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009; compare the Social 
Progress Index [Porter and Stern 2015], especial-
ly “Access to information and communication”). 
The consequences of media for social progress 
can be approached from many angles. Our main 
emphasis will be on media as providers of con-
tent and infrastructures of connection, since 
these are media’s most important aspects for so-
cial progress. 
1.1 Media as infrastructures of connection 
Developments in media technologies over the 
past three decades have expanded massively the 
capacity of human beings and automated systems 
to create, use, disseminate, and store information 
and content of all types across time and space. 
This has happened through the emergence of the 
Internet, the digitization of previously analogue 
content, and the development of new platforms 
and devices. Changes have come so fast that it is 
easy to forget the much longer history of media’s 
role in the formation of modern societies, pol-
ities, and economies. In this chapter we seek to 
recognize that longer history, while also reflect-
ing upon the dramatic nature of media’s transfor-
mations over the past three decades. 
Media inherently involve the production, shar-
ing and interpretation of meanings, and so me-
dia processes are always contestable and open 
to further interpretation. Yet media remain at 
the same time infrastructure: networks of inter-
dependencies that enable social, political, and 
economic action, but also encode both cultural 
and technological constraints. This double role 
of media, as both meaning and infrastructure 
(Sewell 2005; Boczkowski and Siles 2014), re-
quires investigating both media cultures – what 
users and audiences do with the media, their 
“media-related practices” (Couldry 2012) – and 
media affordances: how media infrastructures 
shape the range of possible uses available to ev-
eryday users and audiences. 
1. Introduction: media infrastructures and communication flows 
41.2 Media as enablers of increasing cultural 
complexity 
Media infrastructures have acquired a particular 
complexity and reach in the past three decades 
due to the global but uneven spread of the In-
ternet and social media platforms. Globalization 
has distributed flows of meaning more transna-
tionally than before. Mundane exposure to me-
dia images and messages that flow from other 
parts of the world encourages people to become 
more reflexively open to the meanings produced 
in other places. This has generated unprecedent-
ed cross-border connection, dialogue, and soli-
darity. 
However the basic patterns underlying contem-
porary media flows have much earlier origins. 
From the birth of the press through the devel-
opment of postal, telephone, radio, and televi-
sion networks, media flows and infrastructures 
have been crucial to successive modern forms 
of citizenship, providing information about 
governments and markets, connecting national 
populations and economies, providing forums 
for citizen practice and underpinning national 
identity (Anderson 1983). Media flows and in-
frastructures have also played central roles in 
projects of political and economic domination, 
providing the information necessary to govern 
empires, manage enterprises, and control popu-
lations. But media’s spread across the world has 
been uneven, as Section 2 explains. 
Despite increasing convergence of platforms for 
media delivery, proliferating media flows and 
infrastructures have produced cultural complex-
ity and increased the possibilities for cultural 
contestation, within and across national bor-
ders (Hannerz 1992; Iwabuchi 2002). Imagined 
communities, sustained by media, now prolifer-
ate involving for example marginalized people, 
diasporic communities, and political activists. 
Digital media have also enabled more people to 
become active producers and disseminators of 
images and meanings. This expanded productiv-
ity of meaning through media has itself become 
a practical precondition for new movements for 
social progress. 
1.3 The social justice issues raised by media 
and communications 
Through media, individuals and groups have 
more cultural resources with which to interpret 
and challenge cultural forms. Such access enrich-
es the modalities of political action and protest, 
with consequences for social change and social 
progress (relevant SPI indicators are “Person-
al rights” and “Personal freedom and choice”).5 
The political struggles against slavery in the 
nineteenth century and for the civil rights of all 
ethnic groups in the late twentieth century were 
also cultural struggles that drew on contempo-
rary media resources. But because media im-
pact is always contestable, the consequences of 
media practice and media innovations for social 
progress cannot be determined at a general level. 
Media globalization has both engendered indif-
ference and disparity of attention and promoted 
dialogue and solidarity. Media and communi-
cations’ contribution to social progress must al-
ways be considered at more specific levels.
Nonetheless, since connection is important to 
people’s possibilities of action, the uneven distri-
bution of opportunities to access media and use 
them effectively is a dimension of social justice in 
its own right. Improved “access to information 
5 The SPI report is found in Porter and Stern 2015.
5and communications technology,” including 
“universal affordable access to the Internet” by 
2020, is rightly a Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG 9.c),6 but it raises fundamental social jus-
tice issues too. First, media are a key resource 
that enables the “reality” of particular social and 
political territories to be framed one way rather 
than another; as a result, media, through their 
operations, can perpetrate specific “injustices 
[in] framing” (Fraser 2005: 79) the social world. 
Second, because media have the symbolic power 
to construct general realities, media institutions 
comprise a resource whose long-term distribu-
tion can be unjust. Some battles for social prog-
ress contest particular media representations; 
others challenge media institutions’ general 
control over symbolic power. In still other cases, 
media provide a forum for challenging injustices 
unconnected with media. 
The relations between media, communications, 
and social progress are therefore inherently 
complex. Measures of social progress (such as 
the SPI) require considerable adjustment if they 
are to fully take account of media’s contribution 
to social progress: measures of technological ac-
cess alone are insufficient. Nor (see Section 2) is 
there a common pattern to how media institu-
tions “work” in societies across the world. Even 
so, media and communications have important 
potential to contribute to particular struggles for 
social justice.
1.4 Media, communications and the longer 
global struggle for media reform 
Now is not the first time that the implications of 
media flows and infrastructures for social prog-
ress have been considered on a global scale. Such 
questions were central to the MacBride Report 
prepared for UNESCO in 1980 (Many Voices, 
One World), which followed two decades of con-
tested debate about “development”. The report 
proposed a New World Information and Com-
munication Order (“NWICO”) and challenged 
the assumption that a global media infrastructure 
dominated by “the West” was good for democra-
cy, social order and human rights. But the Mac-
Bride Report’s proposals were not implemented, 
and a recent attempt to revive their broad agenda 
(the World Summit on the Information Society 
in 2003) has also achieved only limited success.7 
The history of “media reform” on a global scale is 
an interrupted one (MacBride and Roach 1989), 
which we discuss more fully in Section 6. Mean-
while, the relations between media and capitalist 
accumulation (Schiller 1999; Jin 2015) become 
ever more complex, and new market-based me-
dia infrastructures – for example, social media 
platforms and the vast infrastructures of data ex-
traction on which they rely – pose increasingly 
urgent questions for social life and democratic 
practice. 
6 The SDGs are found in United Nations 2015.
7 For a reassessment, see Vincent and Nordenstreng (2015).
6This section introduces the diversity and uneven-
ness of media infrastructures, media access, and 
media’s cultural dynamics across the world. As 
such, it provides the reference point for later dis-
cussions of contemporary forms of communica-
tion inequality and opportunities for, or threats 
to, public knowledge (Sections 3 and 4) and the 
emergence of new spaces for citizenship (Section 
5) and the long history of struggles for “democra-
tization of media” and “democratization through 
media” (Zhao and Hackett 2005) (Sections 6 and 
7). 
2.1 Traditional media and the Internet as 
infrastructures of connection 
Policy discourses about media have been dom-
inated by the histories of how “modern” media 
(newspapers, radio, television, film) developed 
in Western Europe and North America. While 
scholarship on the complex regional flows of 
media has challenged the dominance of Western 
history (Schiller 1969; Boyd-Barrett 1977; Iwa-
buchi 2007; Sinclair and Jacka 1996), the same 
geographical skewing has been repeated in re-
cent accounts of the rise of the Internet (Chan 
2013). We will argue against this simplified view. 
No universal history of media is possible on a 
global scale. Today’s uneven global media land-
scape reflects many diverse histories: the con-
trasting reliance on public service versus com-
mercial models of broadcasting in European 
and North American media systems; major lin-
guistic and institutional diversity in Australasia 
and the Pacific; the contrasting roles played by 
state and market in India versus China; the su-
per-fast growth of online connectivity in North-
East Asian economies dominated by Chaebols 
(family-owned multinationals in South Korea); 
the contrasting legacies of colonialism in media 
development in Africa and Latin America; the 
distinctive role played by Gulf petro-monarchies 
in the Arab region’s media. There are many pos-
sible relations between media, state, market, and 
society, each shaped differently by geopolitical 
forces, which rule out a universal narrative of 
“media and 10 social progress”. In what follows 
we present case studies from different regions to 
underscore not only media’s diversity at a na-
tional level, but also how variously media and 
communication systems intersect to generate re-
sources for social progress. Further case studies 
are added in later Sections (4 and 6).
2.2 Case Studies 
Country case study one: China/Russia8
 
Today, Russia and China have large media sys-
tems which are highly distinctive in that, while 
incorporating various market features, they 
trace their historical origins to twentieth centu-
ry state-controlled noncommercial media sys-
tems, whose organization had intellectual roots 
in Marxist-Leninist critiques of capitalist and 
imperialist control of the media in the West. As 
such, both systems share the legacy of today’s 
“social movement media,” but are also internally 
complex and marked by nationalistic and secto-
rial struggles. Indeed, the Chinese system had 
distinctive differences from the Soviet model and 
by the early 1960s, the Soviet and Chinese me-
dia systems were in serious ideological conflict. 
2. Media industries from print to the Internet
8 Material on Russia in this case study written by Olessia Koltsova.
7By the late 1960s, the Chinese media system was 
destabilized in the onset of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Nevertheless, what these historical systems 
had in common was their communist visions of 
achieving social progress through ideological 
mobilization and cultural enfranchisement. This 
vision provided many Third World postcolonial 
states with alternative models for media organi-
zation from those in the West while also provid-
ing inspiration for social struggles in the West, 
including U.S. civil rights struggles (Dudziak 
2000; Frazier 2015). However, bureaucratic ossi-
fication, and other forms of political, social, and 
cultural repression, as well as the influence of 
Western media, contributed to the transforma-
tions of China’s and Russia’s media systems from 
the early 1980s. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with 
a television-centered noncommercial media sys-
tem. Liberalization, fractionalization of the post-
communist political elite, and economic difficul-
ties led to privatization of state TV channels in 
the mid-1990s. Newly founded private television 
channels emerged as the economic situation im-
proved, bringing more diversity into the media 
landscape. However, the early years of the twen-
ty-first century have seen a gradual renational-
ization of most leading TV channels, outside the 
entertainment sector. The Russian government 
inherited from its Soviet predecessor direct con-
trol over transmission networks and appoint-
ment of the top television management. While 
the 1990s saw media wars between different tele-
vision channels representing various political 
groups, the 2000s were marked by emergence 
of an identical pro-Kremlin picture on most 
TV channels. Social and media development is, 
however, very uneven across Russian provinc-
es, varying from near subsistence farmers (with 
access to just 2-3 analogue TV channels and no 
Internet) to highly networked and cosmopolitan 
major cities. The government’s television-based 
policy of media control is more effective in poor-
er, less connected regions. While the authorities 
have allowed a few oppositional media outlets 
(TV Dojd’ [Rain] on the Internet; RBC [Ros-
BusinessConsulting] on cable and satellite; Ekho 
Moskvy [Echo of Moscow] on the radio), they 
have very little influence on public opinion. On 
a global scale, given the denial for two decades 
to Russian television of broadcasting frequencies 
in most post-Soviet countries, the government 
launched Russia Today as a news provider, which 
is rapidly emerging as a major transnational sat-
ellite channel. 
Against the trend of most other Russian indus-
tries, the Russian Internet industry has been very 
successful. Russia is the only country where lo-
cal Internet businesses have beaten global giants 
without any protective barriers, with Yandex 
search engine more popular in Russia than Goo-
gle, while Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki social 
networking sites are attracting much larger local 
audiences than Facebook. Nevertheless, the Rus-
sian government is facing a challenging choice 
with regard to Internet management. It has been 
eager to make the Internet a “locomotive” for 
the rest of the Russian economy, but this risk 
weakens disrupting the vision promoted by the 
government’s continued control of Russian tele-
vision, since government control of the Internet 
is weaker. Attempts to increase Internet control 
through progovernment ownership of Russian 
social media sites such as LiveJournal and VKon-
takte might drive a key segment of the news 
reading Internet audience to foreign competitors 
such as Facebook. The Russian government has 
developed three main tactics: gaining ownership 
over online media; producing its own “user gen-
erated content”; and blocking websites. The re-
sult has been a dramatic polarization of Russian 
audiences between a loyal majority and a criti-
8cal minority both online and offline. This policy 
coupled with state support of Internet-based cre-
ativity, has encouraged the Russian IT sector to 
move away from politically sensitive issues. 
China’s post-1980 media system has developed 
very differently from the Russian system. Chi-
na’s media system retains its overall Leninist 
structure and core organizational principles, yet 
through post-Mao China’s economic growth and 
rapid industrial expansion, China’s print and 
broadcasting media industries are both larger 
and more highly developed, and more tightly 
integrated and centrally controlled than Russia’s. 
By mid-2015, China had over 2,000 newspaper 
titles, nearly 10,000 periodicals, more than 300 
television stations with nearly 3,000 channels, 
with an audience reach of 1.35 billion. However, 
following nearly four decades of state-directed 
commercialization, market consolidation, glob-
al integration, and digital convergence, China’s 
media also bear the hallmarks of market-driven 
systems familiar in other parts of the world. 
At the core of China’s media and communica-
tions infrastructure are state-controlled media 
and communications conglomerations organized 
at national and provincial levels, including Xin-
hua News Agency, People’s Daily Group, CCTV, 
China National Radio and China Radio Inter-
national, and state-owned telecommunication 
providers such as China Mobile, China Telecom, 
and China Unicom. Regional media conglomer-
ates such as Shanghai Media and Entertainment 
Group, Guangdong Nanfang Media Group, and 
Hunan Satellite Television have also been highly 
influential in spearheading institutional reform, 
operational innovations, and content diversifica-
tion. While state control, political direction, and 
censorship remain an enduring issue for China’s 
media professional strata and citizens, particu-
larly in relation to social media platforms, some 
outlets such as CCTV’s well-known prime time 
investigative show Focus Interviews have played 
a significant role in spearheading social reforms. 
Since the late 1990s, the Chinese state has sys-
tematically aimed to build the size and strength 
of its media and communication operations. 
Targeted national initiatives such as the “con-
necting every village” project have significantly 
improved access in China’s remote areas, mak-
ing China’s media and communication infra-
structure one of the most advanced in the Global 
South. At the same time, as part of the Chinese 
state’s effort to address long-standing imbalances 
in global communication and promote its own 
vision of “globalization,” it has systematically ex-
panded the reach of its media and communica-
tion industries, with CCTV establishing branch-
es in North America and Africa, and China 
Telecom and China Mobile expanding globally. 
The Chinese state’s persistent effort to control the 
“commanding heights” of converging media and 
communication industries, regulate global me-
dia and communication flows, manage private 
and foreign capital investments, and pursue the 
latest technological innovations, has had a huge 
impact on the system’s evolving structure and 
values (Hong 2017). 
China’s framework for developing its media 
and communications infrastructure does not 
therefore fit with the dominant Western liberal 
framework that treats press freedom (and “Inter-
net freedom”), defined always as freedom from 
government control, as the precondition of so-
cial progress. Each framework is explained by 
its distinctive historical and geopolitical context: 
accordingly, the more the Chinese media system 
evolves, the more the Communist Party of China 
seeks to emphasize its Leninist founding princi-
ples. 
9Since the early 1990s, the Chinese state has 
mounted an all-out effort for information tech-
nology development through various “golden 
projects” to integrate network applications with 
Chinese politics, economy, and society. In the af-
termath of the 2008 global economic crisis, the 
Chinese state elevated the media, communica-
tion, Internet, and cultural industries as a driver 
of economic restructuring (Hong 2017). In early 
2015, Premier Li Keqiang unveiled the Chinese 
state’s “Internet Plus Action Plan” to stimulate 
economic growth by integrating mobile Internet, 
cloud computing, big data and the “Internet of 
things” with modern manufacturing. No other 
issue has received as much strategic emphasis by 
consecutive Chinese leaderships in the past three 
decades. By the time China-based Internet firm 
Alibaba made a record-setting stock market de-
but in New York in 2014, China had established 
itself as the world’s largest Internet market in 
terms of the number of users, and in December 
2015 China’s Internet population was 688 mil-
lion – just over half of the national population 
(China Internet Network Information Center 
2016). Yet in this project of making China into “a 
cyber power,” the Chinese state treats citizen ac-
cess and government control as not opposed, but 
indissolubly linked (Xinhua 2014). Meanwhile, 
various sectors of Chinese society have enthu-
siastically embraced the Internet (as less tightly 
controlled than the traditional media), turning 
it into a new terrain of discursive struggles over 
China’s future. 
 
These developments challenge any simplistic 
“state versus civil society” reading of how the 
Internet contributes to social progress: both the 
Chinese state and Chinese society have been em-
powered through the Internet (Zhang and Zheng 
2012), with outcomes significantly different from 
the parallel history of media in Russia.
Country case study two: Sweden 
In contrast to government-controlled media 
regimes, Sweden’s media is shaped by a welfare 
state system and characterized by a distinctive re-
lation between media and state, market and civil 
society. Traditionally, Sweden has had high voter 
turnout, and high levels of media and informa-
tion literacy, not least due to the national subsidy 
system for print newspapers, which have result-
ed in a plurality of local newspapers with high 
readership. Typically, the subsidy system pro-
vided for a plurality of political positions, with 
at least two local or regional newspapers repre-
senting two political viewpoints. Like other Eu-
ropean countries, Sweden has had a strong pub-
lic service broadcaster for radio and TV, which 
since the late 1980s has faced strong competition 
from commercial broadcasters. The communi-
cations infrastructure has been well developed, 
with high penetrations of landline phones, mo-
bile phones, and computers. 
The development of Sweden’s news media has 
followed a similar pattern as other north Europe-
an countries, with weakening public service me-
dia (due to audiences migrating to commercial 
channels), and a drift within the press from a fo-
cus on opinion formation to a closer tracking of 
market demand (Weibull 2016). Newspapers are 
today facing dramatic declines in readership, and 
advertising has migrated to the Internet. News 
consumption has also migrated from traditional 
press to social media such as Facebook and Twit-
ter. This shift has challenged Sweden’s distinctive 
relations between media and wider society. 
Since the late 1990s Sweden has witnessed a tight 
horizontal integration of the media sector, with 
companies formerly working within one me-
dia developing tie-ins or purchasing companies 
in other markets: Sweden’s largest media house 
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Bonnier, a book publisher in the nineteenth cen-
tury, moved early into publishing newspapers 
and weekly/monthly magazines, and today owns 
television, cinemas, advertising, and social mar-
keting outlets. The development of “media hous-
es,” with particular regions’ media being largely 
controlled by local or regional media houses, has 
also undermined the press subsidy system, un-
dermining political variety in spite of continued 
state subsidy (Nygren and Zuiderveld 2011). 
The digitization of media contents in particular 
has changed the power dynamics within the me-
dia industries, with the telecommunications in-
dustries acquiring increased importance because 
of their centrality to Wi-Fi and broadband net-
works. This infrastructural power was highlight-
ed in 2016, when TeliaSonera closed an exclu-
sive deal with Facebook for free surfing through 
their networks, perceived as unfair competition 
by Swedish news publishers in print and broad-
casting and contrary to the EU regulation on net 
neutrality (compare Section 6.4 on Facebook In-
dia).9
Because of its well-developed infrastructure for 
high-speed Internet, Sweden is also known as a 
safe-haven for Internet piracy, with The Pirate 
Bay party – its most prominent symbol (Larsson 
2013; Andersson Schwarz 2013) – acting as a fo-
cus for debates on media governance issues.
Country case study three: South Africa
South African media are arguably the most tech-
nologically advanced on the African continent, 
offering a wide range of content across print, 
broadcast, and digital platforms. Its media land-
scape involves a three-tiered model of public, 
commercial, and community media. South Af-
rica became a democracy in 1994, with its early 
period postindependence from Britain (1961) 
better seen as the continuation of colonialism 
in internal form (the apartheid system) (Visser 
1997). But in many ways the country’s media 
show similarities with those elsewhere on the 
continent, where colonialism, the postcolonial 
transition, and globalization have shaped media 
systems.
The changes that South African public broad-
casting has undergone illustrate some of these 
shifts. As in other African countries under mil-
itary or one-party state rule, the South Afri-
can Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) under 
apartheid acted as a state broadcaster. In 1991, 
the Windhoek Declaration, which was put to-
gether by independent African journalists and 
endorsed by UNESCO, initiated a move to great-
er freedom, pluralism, and independence as re-
gards print media. This was followed ten years 
later by the African Charter on Broadcasting 
which created momentum for private, public, 
and community broadcasting. The Windhoek 
Declaration signalled a move towards greater in-
dependence of broadcasting continentwide, even 
if in some countries like Zimbabwe there has 
been a deterioration in recent years (Kupe 2016). 
The Windhoek Declaration coincided with the 
period of negotiated transition in South Africa, 
which saw the SABC adopting a public service 
mandate and media freedom entrenched in the 
new Constitution. The SABC has however never 
been fully publicly funded, and is largely depen-
dent on commercial funding (Kupe 2014:29). As 
in other African countries, the SABC has recent-
ly seen a “push-back” from government (Kupe 
2016): some argue its editorial independence has 
9 SVT Opinion, 2 May 2016. http://www.svt.se/opinion/telias-uppgorelse-med-facebook-ett-slag-mot-svenska-
medieforetag.
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eroded under pressure from an ANC govern-
ment increasingly intolerant of media criticism. 
Other negative signs have been the proposal of a 
statutory Media Appeals Tribunal which would 
impose harsher sanctions on offending journal-
ists and the Protection of State Information Bill 
which could criminalize whistleblowers, investi-
gative journalists, and civil society activists who 
access information classified by government as 
secret (R2K 2015).
South Africa led the way in newspaper develop-
ment in Anglophone Africa, with the publica-
tion of the Cape Town Gazette in 1800 (Karikari 
2007:13), and a centuries-old private commercial 
press. Under apartheid, mainstream newspapers 
either supported the regime (the Afrikaans-lan-
guage press) or provided a limited critique (the 
English press), while an alternative, under-
ground press engaged in a more radical critique 
of apartheid and faced harassment, censure, and 
closures. Democratization largely eliminated the 
parallelism between language and political ori-
entation, and most South African newspapers 
adopted a watchdog approach to the government 
and reflected a liberal, commercial consensus.
Meanwhile, South African media have been af-
fected by global investment processes. The South 
African press was a major capitalist venture from 
its inception. For example, the South African 
media company Naspers has become a global-
ized conglomerate, while the Irish Indepen-
dent group bought the largest English-language 
newspaper group in 1994, selling it in 2013 to the 
Sekunjalo consortium, in which Chinese busi-
ness interests have a major stake. Widely seen as 
a vehicle for soft power in Africa, several state-
owned Chinese media houses have offices on the 
continent (Kenya as well as South Africa), in-
cluding the news agency Xinhua, the newspaper 
China Daily, China Central Television, and Chi-
na Radio International. China has also funded 
Africa’s media and communications infrastruc-
ture (Wu 2012). The influence of the Chinese 
media presence and investments in African me-
dia on journalistic norms and practices has been 
controversial, and challenges any simple regional 
or Western-dominated model of media diversity.
During the transition to democracy, a particu-
lar attempt was made to strengthen the commu-
nity media sector through the establishment of 
the Media Development and Diversity Agency 
(MDDA) to fund media owned and controlled 
by the community they serve, especially to en-
able more Black ownership of media (Banda 
2006). Another important development has 
been the rise of popular tabloid newspapers 
which, although commercially owned, provide 
perspectives from the poor, mostly Black, work-
ing class rarely found in mainstream print media 
(Wasserman 2010). Some of the most interesting 
alternatives to the mainstream print media in 
South Africa have been online (the Daily Mav-
erick, The Con and Groundup). Such publications 
have provided critical analysis and investigative 
reporting often surpassing the mainstream press 
in South Africa in diversity and depth. Despite 
the obstacles in terms of access and reach, dig-
ital media platforms are increasingly reshaping 
social relationships and public spheres in Africa 
(Mabweazara 2015: 2). Meanwhile, the mobile 
phone has had a massive impact as a platform 
for Internet access, for reconstituting traditional 
modes of sociality (Mabweazara 2015: 2-3), and, 
via social media platforms, providing spaces for 
citizens to engage in political debate and mobi-
lize for social change.
Country case study four: Indonesia10
An important case of a diverse media system is 
Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia 
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with a population of 240 million, and the fourth 
largest democracy in the world. The establish-
ment of Indonesia’s modern media system owes 
greatly to the legacies of President Soeharto’s 
five-year economic development plans, which 
centralized capital and inhabitants in Java. For 
decades the authoritarian state held strong con-
trol over media infrastructure and content, from 
the press, radio, film, satellite, to television. The 
media system was built to support state develop-
mentalism, limiting civilians to accessing infor-
mation provided by the state.
During the 1960s-1980s, Indonesia had a sin-
gle, state broadcasting system, Television of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Although designed as a 
network system, television infrastructure and 
production relied heavily on central funding and 
programming (Sen and Hill 2000). The state-con-
trolled television system shifted to an open, pri-
vatized, and more liberal system in the late 1980s 
as a consequence of the government’s open mar-
ket and open sky policy. These policies allowed 
foreign content via satellite television and cable 
networks (Hollander et al. 2009), which catered 
to the needs of the expanding urban middle 
class. By the early 1990s, dozens of private tele-
vision stations had been founded, owned by the 
President’s close allies. This gave precedence 
to market demand over commercial news, and 
gradually weakened state control over informa-
tion. Around the same time, the Internet came 
to Indonesia, providing an alternative source of 
information to a small elite in Java (Sen and Hill 
2000; Lim 2003). Media liberalization and com-
mercialization of information paved way for the 
growth of a civil society (Hollander et al. 2009; 
Hill and Sen 2005), which was the prelude to In-
donesia’s transition towards democracy.
The authoritarian regime finally broke under the 
weight of the Asian economic crisis of 1997, in 
the face of increasing public pressure and con-
flicting interests within the ruling elite, starting 
a social transformation among an expanding 
middle class amid conditions of unprecedented 
economic growth (Basri 2012). While market 
demand over commercial news had helped the 
push for democratic transition, since the ear-
ly 2000s the development of the news media in 
Indonesia have relied more on market responses 
rather than having an independent democratic 
agenda (see Lim 2011). Television is Indonesia’s 
most popular media with a penetration rate of 
97% (Nielsen 2014), and it continues to attract 
the dominant share of advertising income.
Second to television, the Internet has the high-
est penetration rate of 34.9% in 2014 (APJII 
2015) or 88 million users to 51.8% in 2016 (AP-
JII 2016). Nielsen (2011) estimated that 48% of 
mobile phone owners use their phones to access 
the Internet. This has caused the closing of print 
versions of newspapers, while digital news has 
seen a steady rise. Over two decades, Indonesia’s 
media have seen a convergence whereby estab-
lished media companies, initially specialized in 
one form of media – print, television, or online – 
are expanding into other media, forming larger, 
multiplatform converged conglomerates (Tapsell 
2015). Indonesia experienced the largest num-
ber of mergers and acquisitions in the history of 
its media system in 2011 (Nugroho et al. 2012), 
establishing four large media conglomerates, 
namely MNC Group, Jawa Pos Group, Kom-
pas Gramedia Group, and Mahaka Group (Lim 
2012). There has emerged a set of interconnect-
ed relationships between politicians and media 
proprietors, with various political leaders own-
ing media companies. The CEO of MNC Group, 
10 Case study written by Inaya Rakhmani.
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Hary Tanoesoedibjo, founded and heads the po-
litical party Perindo, and ran for vice president 
of Indonesia in 2015. MNC Group owns three 
terrestrial television stations, one pay television 
station with 60% of market share, 14 local tele-
vision stations, one newspaper, one online news 
portal, and several franchise magazines. This has 
allowed media conglomerates to republish the 
same news content on multiple platforms.
Significantly, the Internet infrastructure and ser-
vice provision remain dominated by state enter-
prises Telkom and Indosat, which caters mostly 
to urban users in large cities. Media markets and 
conglomeration are concentrated in Jakarta and 
Java more broadly, monetizing the activities of 
Internet users in large cities while excluding us-
ers in rural areas and small cities. Only 20% of 
women in Indonesia have Internet access (World 
Wide Web Foundation 2016), which calls for 
new ways for inclusive approaches that are gen-
der-informed (see Triastuti 2014). International 
forces are important too: in 2015, 70% of digi-
tal advertising revenue in Indonesia (USD 560 
million) went directly to Google and Facebook, 
rather than national companies. Consequently, 
media systems in Indonesia today still reflect the 
centralization model that was established since 
the 1960s, while also registering the power of 
global digital platforms.
Country case study five: Mexico11
The media system in Mexico is highly concen-
trated and deeply marketized. Its core is com-
mercial broadcasting, owned by private corpo-
rations controlled by a handful of individuals. 
The power of those media corporations was 
built from alliances between powerful econom-
ic groups aligned with government interests that 
have benefited from discretionary grants, televi-
sion and radio concessions, lucrative contracts 
for governmental advertising in print media, and 
ad hoc legislation (or lack of it) in favor of the 
sector’s economic interests.
After the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) the 
country adopted a capitalist economic model and 
initiated a corporatization of the Mexican State. 
From 1929 to 2000 all presidents were members 
of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). 
Lack of regulation and communication policies 
led to a concentration of media in a few families. 
In the early twentieth century, well-established 
industrial families (railways, mining, and bank-
ing) invested in radio broadcasting. After WWI, 
U.S. capital replaced European investments in 
Mexico, with large investments in the radio in-
dustry (radio stations, manufacture and sales 
of radio devices, records, phonographs). Today 
there are 1,600 radio stations, but 80% of them 
are owned by thirteen commercial families.
In 1950 the Mexican television industry started, 
modeled on the U.S. commercial system. The 
families who owned radio stations became, in 
turn, the owners of television stations, for exam-
ple, the Azcárraga family which, from its original 
concession of Channel 2, grew through mergers 
to create the now better-known Televisa (Tele-
visión Vía Satélite). From 1972 to 1993 Televisa 
was Mexico’s only private television company, 
competing with three public television channels. 
From its origins, Televisa had a close link with 
the ruling party PRI. Televisa subsequently be-
came the most influential global producer and 
distributer of Spanish-language audiovisual con-
tents, and currently owns free-to-air television 
channels, restricted television systems (satellite 
and cable), a leading Spanish editorial house, 
11 Case study written by Claudia Magallanes-Blanco.
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radio stations, entertainment companies, soc-
cer teams and stadiums, music recording com-
panies, and cinema distribution companies. In 
the early 1990s the public television channels 7 
and 13 were privatized. The Salinas Pliego family 
(owners of departmental stores and previously 
radio manufacturers) bought both channels and 
created Televisión Azteca offering contents sim-
ilar to those of Televisa and aligning itself with 
the government.
The early 1990s also saw the privatization of tele-
communications, generating another monopoly 
(Telmex-Telcel) in the hands of just one individ-
ual, Carlos Slim. Slim’s monopoly started with 
landline telephone services (Telmex has 65% of 
the national market) and moved on to mobile te-
lephony (Telcel has 65% of subscribers) and In-
ternet services (75% of subscribers). The govern-
ment justified the sale of the nation’s telephone 
company to a single owner by arguing that a 
monopoly would scale economies, lower costs, 
and increase the number of landlines. However, 
Mexico’s mobile phone and Internet service costs 
are actually in the middle of international rank-
ings (International Telecommunications Union 
2014), and, although, since the early 2000s, In-
ternet home users have grown from 5% to 61% of 
the population, the digital divide between urban 
and rural areas has widened.
Political reforms have continuously supported 
deregulation and privatization, and changes in 
legislation have meant more power and influence 
for media monopolies, generating a mediacracy, 
where members of senate and congress have di-
rect links with the media industry. In 2012 the 
PRI party regained the presidency of Mexico, 
with Enrique Peña Nieto elected with the full 
support of the media industry, mainly Televisa. 
In 2013 Peña Nieto promoted a historic constitu-
tional reform in telecommunications and broad-
casting with the aim to increase competition in 
the sector. The new legislation enabled Televisa 
to enter the telecommunications market by of-
fering triple play services (cable television, land-
line telephone services, and Internet). Televisa 
now controls the market of restricted television 
(cable and satellite) with 60% of subscribers and 
in 2014 and 2015 purchased two new cable com-
panies. The new legislation punishes Telmex by 
imposing strict restrictions on telephone carriers 
(cancellation of long distance fees; a prohibition 
on charging for interconnection services).
There are also positive aspects to this new legis-
lation. While public services are still offered by 
private entities through concessions regimes that 
distinguish between commercial, public, and so-
cial media (indigenous and cultural), with the 
latter not allowed to sell advertisements (previ-
ously community and indigenous media were 
not recognized, and so operated outside any le-
gal framework), telecommunications and broad-
casting have now been defined as fundamental 
human rights and public services (compare SDG 
9.c). As for telecommunications, the new leg-
islation reserves a portion of the spectrum for 
social concessions, reflecting the work done by 
the community cellular network in creating a 
network of mobile phone services for indigenous 
communities previously denied mobile phone 
services by the major telecommunication com-
panies. Civil society activism in Mexico has be-
gun slowly to correct for some of the excesses of 
previous marketization.
*      *      *      *      *
The section has introduced the diversity of the 
world’s media systems and their organization: 
state, market, and civil society may work in iso-
lation or together in multiple combinations, with 
varying consequences for how media and com-
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munications outputs provide a context for social 
progress and struggles for social justice.
2.3 Unevenness of access
The stark differences in access to media between 
population sectors may have consequences for 
social progress. It is significant that basic levels 
of mobile phone subscriptions and Internet ac-
cess are included as items in the SPI, alongside 
concerns about state control of media registered 
in the press freedom index (compare SDG 9.c).
Effective media access depends on the interrela-
tionship between media and other closely related 
factors: literacy, language, and education (SDG 
4). This is the central lesson from the “digital 
divide” debate: that simple availability of tech-
nology is not sufficient for development or so-
cial progress. Empowerment of people through 
Media and Information Literacy is an important 
prerequisite for fostering equitable access to in-
formation and knowledge and promoting free, 
independent and pluralistic media and informa-
tion systems (UNESCO 2013). Adequate levels of 
media use require training and education, dem-
ocratic participation, accessibility of formats and 
technology for people with disabilities and other 
distinctive needs, diverse content in appropriate 
languages, freedom of expression, and opportu-
nities for community and citizen-produced me-
dia. The 2005 Tunis Agenda for The Information 
Society acknowledged these factors, and they 
have since been the focus of international efforts 
(WSIS 2005). The multifaceted nature of “access” 
is crucial to understanding media’s integral role 
in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, 
and broader social progress (International Tele-
communications Union 2016) (SPI “Access to in-
formation and communications”).
Globally, there has been progress on access to 
Internet and mobile phones in the past twenty 
years (SPI “Access to information and commu-
nications”; “Mobile telephone subscriptions”). 
However, what such broad indicators of “ac-
cess” mean on-the-ground is poorly understood: 
much depends on what kinds of media, Internet, 
and mobile content people can affordably access. 
What media access do people need as the min-
imum for a “universal” service? Without closer 
attention to these questions, today’s push to ev-
er-greater digital connectivity only risks deepen-
ing digital exclusion.
There are regions with highly uneven media ac-
cess. Asia, for instance, includes countries such 
as South Korea and Japan, both pioneers in digi-
tal media, as well as emerging powerhouses (In-
dia, China). India has gone from fewer than 1% 
of individuals using the Internet (in 2000-2001) 
to 18 % in 2014; China has moved from 1.78 % in 
2000 to 49.3% in 2014. Yet other Asian countries 
have poor media infrastructure, including Ban-
gladesh (9.6 % Internet users) and Laos (14.26 
%) (International Telecommunications Union 
2015). In Latin America, the mobile phone land-
scape is not homogenous, but the rapid spread of 
mobile phones is in part explained by the previ-
ous lack of landlines. In a number of countries, 
total figures for mobile phone subscriptions are 
high – for instance, Chile, Argentina, and Méx-
ico (International Telecommunications Union 
2016). However, on closer inspection, there is a 
significant proportion of the population in these 
and other countries without adequate access to 
mobile communication – either through not 
owning a phone or through restricted use of ser-
vices due to affordability (Donner 2015).
Within countries, there are also striking dispar-
ities in access (SDG 9.c), especially in rural and 
remote areas, among different sociodemograph-
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ics, cultural, ethnic, and racial groups, and groups 
with reduced or uncertain legal or citizenship 
status (for example migrants and internally dis-
placed persons). Upon closer inspection, many 
cities with apparent “good infrastructure” dis-
play great differences between the media “have-
less” and “have-mores”. Yet other countries have 
seen extraordinary large-scale growth. Among 
China’s 688 million Internet users (2015), the 
vast majority (620 million) use social media ap-
plications such as Weibo and Tencent’s Wechat; 
around 90% of China’s Internet-using popula-
tion access the Internet through mobile phones, 
while Internet use for online payments, access to 
online education and medical services, has be-
come widespread among the middle classes.
We must however note the continuing lack of 
gender equity in access to and use of media. 
Significantly fewer women are connected to 
the Internet than men. In twenty-four of twen-
ty-nine European countries between 2008 and 
2010, men outnumbered women users of Inter-
net. For the same time period in non-European 
countries, men outnumbered women users in 
thirty-six of thirty-nine countries (comprising 
OECD and non-OECD countries). The “global 
Internet user gender gap” widened from 11% in 
2013 to 12% in 2016. In the poorest countries, the 
gap is large: 31% in the least developed countries. 
On a regional level, there is significant dispari-
ty in the gender gap: 23% in Africa compared to 
the Americas. In many countries, gender often 
intersects with other factors (e.g. location, age) 
to create even deeper inequalities. Only a few 
countries report higher Internet use by women 
compared to men (International Telecommuni-
cations Union 2016).
Such figures give just a partial insight into a com-
plex situation of inequality. Profound changes in 
media technologies are typically accompanied by 
promises to improve gender inequalities yet such 
technologies are often unaffordable for many 
groups of women, and gender is often neglect-
ed in design, education, and resource processes 
crucial to ensuring communication rights. The 
emergence of new technologies may generate 
new kinds of injustice and exclusion: misogyny 
and oppressive gender relations have taken dis-
turbing forms on social media platforms. Such 
gendered aspects of media and ICTs significant-
ly hinder social progress, as noted in the agenda 
laid out by UNESCO’s Global Alliance on Gen-
der and Media.
Media’s contribution to social progress cannot 
therefore be understood without grasping both 
the distribution and differentiation of media ac-
cess, and how they shape possibilities for politi-
cal and social agency.
2.4 Cultural flows of media within regions
Putting the complexities of media infrastruc-
ture to one side, media’s cultural forms and con-
sequences also vary significantly from region 
to region. Western colonial powers such as the 
United Kingdom, France and the United States 
dominated global information flows during and 
after the colonial period. Those media culture 
flows were unevenly shaped by the long-standing 
centrality of the United States, with which even 
the United Kingdom and France could not com-
pete. Some Western countries (such as France) 
developed media regulation to contest U.S. cul-
tural dominance and foster “national culture”.
In a globalized world, however, more complex 
flows of media culture have evolved. Cultural 
globalization does not simply homogenize the 
world, but instead reorganizes the production 
of cultural diversity (Hannerz 1996). By cre-
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atively localizing and indigenizing U.S. cultural 
influences, some non-Western countries such as 
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Japan, South Korea and 
India have achieved high levels of media produc-
tion capacity, especially in the last two decades. 
The media outputs of those countries circulate 
transnationally and are favorably received within 
and beyond their regions, generating important 
counterflows to U.S. dominance.
In Latin America, the predominant mainstream 
cultural flow is telenovelas, or “soap opera” TV 
drama series, which have been exported globally. 
Export formats have evolved from selling pro-
gram series to selling only the show’s central idea 
or main character (Biltereyst and Meers 2000; La 
Pastina and Straubhaar 2005).12 Mexican, Brazil-
ian, and Colombian television content has shift-
ed what Latin Americans watch on their screens. 
If 1970s and 1980s generations grew up watch-
ing mainly U.S.-produced imports, today’s Latin 
American audiences are exposed to the customs, 
life-styles, and social fabric of Latin American 
communities themselves. And, although Latin 
American media content still privileges the vis-
ibility of upper class and predominantly White 
groups, some content does depict the experi-
ences of working class and non-White Latin 
Americans. Additionally, free trade agreements 
and the growing number of migrants from Latin 
American countries to North America have gen-
erated new North-South media content flows; 
since 1994, Spanish-language media has grown 
exponentially in the United States, and Univisión 
(owned by Hallmark) and Telemundo (owned by 
Sony) are the two main Spanish-language cable 
television networks. Univisión benefits from an 
agreement with Mexico’s Televisa, including a 
pipeline of Spanish-language content. Other less-
er players in the global field of Spanish-language 
media include CNN, BBC, MTV, and Fox, with 
news and sports channels entirely in Spanish.13 
But overall the unevenness of mainstream au-
diences’ daily media fare has not changed much 
since the mid-1990s: Latin American media in-
clude mostly Latin American and U.S. content 
(music, films, TV), plus a trickle of Japanese an-
ime and European media content (mainly BBC). 
Flows from other regions of the world (Africa, 
South and Southeast Asia) are still scarce.
The impact of globalization on African media has 
also shifted the flows and contraflows of media 
content and capital. After the long dominance of 
ex-colonial powers, many countries have recently 
developed media production capacities. A prom-
inent example is the growth of the Nigerian film 
industry “Nollywood,” which exports to a glob-
al audience (Krings and Onookome 2013; Lar-
kin 2008). It has become the third largest glob-
al producer of feature films, next to Hollywood 
(United States) and Bollywood (India), relying 
increasingly on coproduction and distribution 
with the Ghanaian film industry. Also notable 
are the growing African and global footprint 
of the South African media giant Naspers, and 
significant foreign investment in African media 
firms, especially from China (Xinhua news agen-
cy, China Central Television: see Section 2.1).
In Asia, India, Hong Kong, and Japan have devel-
oped local film and TV industries and their out-
puts have circulated within the region for many 
years. However, circulation outside the region 
has jumped sharply in the last two decades. The 
global diffusion of Bollywood films has become 
12 The best example is the Colombian Ugly Betty, which has a Mexican and a U.S. adaptation, each completely different 
from the Colombian source, apart from the main character (Miller 2010).
13 http://palabraclave.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/palabraclave/article/viewFile/4669/pdf
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much more prominent (Kavoori and Punath-
ambekar 2008; Gopal and Moorti 2008). In East 
Asia, cultural products such as manga, anima-
tion, video games, and TV dramas produced in 
Japan have generated a regional and global me-
dia culture since the 1990s (Iwabuchi 2002). Even 
more notable is the so-called “Korean Wave” (or 
Halryu, a term first coined by Chinese reporters 
in 1999), whereby Korean cultural products such 
as films, television dramas, fashion, and popu-
lar music (K-pop) have penetrated other Asian 
markets (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008; Kim 2013), 
Europe, and Latin America. The Korean Wave 
offers an intriguing example of how national cul-
tural policy can be used as a form of soft power, 
bolstering local production capacity and pro-
moting the export of media culture by “creative 
industries”. South Korea’s interventionist cultural 
policies position the Korean cultural industry as 
a “sub-empire” of the Hollywood system in Asia. 
The “Korean Wave” thus signifies the Korean 
culture industry’s ambiguous position as both a 
counterflow against the Hollywood system and a 
subflow co-opted by Hollywood.
This complexity characterizes counterflows in 
other regions too. The more counterflows to 
American media culture advance, the more mar-
ket-driven governance encompasses them. Even 
though relatively independent from the cultur-
al dominance of the “Hollywood empire,” the 
rise of media culture flows in non-Western re-
gions has given rise to new intraregional asym-
metries. American media culture maintains a 
pivotal presence, yet in a way that goes beyond 
a straightforward understanding of American 
cultural hegemony. Hollywood itself has striv-
en to incorporate capital, talent, and narratives 
from many parts of the world and develop out-
sourcing of postproduction labor on a global 
scale (Miller et al. 2004). The rise of non-West-
ern media cultures forms part of a market-driven 
recentralization in which diverse players across 
the world collaborate to penetrate transnational 
markets, engendering a new kind of governance 
via marketing, coproduction, distribution, and 
copyright monopoly. Section 3 will discuss the 
emergence of global governance infrastructures 
for the regulation of information and data.
This is not to underestimate the newly emerg-
ing landscape of media globalization. Togeth-
er with the progress of digital communication 
technologies, the acceleration of human mobil-
ities from and among non-Western regions (by 
migrants, expatriates, students) has complicated 
the cross-border circulation and consumption 
of media cultures. Meanwhile cultural counter-
flows between diverse regions and countries cul-
tivate cross-border exchange and dialogue, with 
important implications for social progress. Re-
gional circulation of diverse media cultures has 
enabled new kinds of cross-border connection, 
mutual understanding, and self-reflexivity by 
people about their own society and culture. The 
mutual consumption of media cultures, for exam-
ple of entertainment genres popular with women 
audiences such as soap operas, has enabled mu-
tual understanding of societies and cultures, for 
example in regions such as East Asia. However, as 
it is predominantly market-oriented forces that 
have advanced cross-border media circulation, it 
is the commercially and ideologically dominant 
elements of each country’s media culture that 
tend to travel, under-representing marginalized 
voices (Iwabuchi 2002; 2015). Crucial questions 
thus remain: whose voices and concerns are ex-
cluded, what perceptions of self-other relation-
ships are typically promoted, and which issues 
are under-represented, as the marketization of 
media culture flows advances? Section 5 consid-
ers the ambivalent consequences for practices of 
global citizenship that such media connections 
may foster.
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2.5 Digital disruptions and transforma-
tions (technological, geo-political)
Even before 2005, the global media landscape 
was highly uneven, and its implications for so-
cial progress correspondingly complex. Some 
key developments since the middle of the cen-
tury’s first decade (when Facebook, the world’s 
current most successful social media platform, 
was launched) have increased this complexity 
considerably. Of course there is not today “one” 
Internet – much of the Internet is inaccessible in 
language to large sections of the world’s popula-
tion – but some key patterns are clear.
The key technological development has been 
the shift from so-called “web 1.0” – a system 
of media infrastructure based on discrete web-
sites, connected by hypertext links, with access 
obtained from desktop or laptop computers – 
to “web 2.0” characterized by increasing use of 
interactive online platforms, in particular social 
media platforms. Today, both platforms and 
websites are increasingly accessed from phones 
and other mobile devices, and the applications 
(or “apps”) embedded within them. This change 
from a “read only” to a “read/write” interface has 
intensified Internet use and its embedding in dai-
ly life, heightening institutional attention to how 
audiences can be reached online and stimulating 
the rise of a vast commercial infrastructure of 
online data collection and data processing. This 
shift in media as “infrastructure” has involved 
also a significant cultural shift, as patterns of use 
have changed (a shift in media as “meaning”). 
This double shift has multiple consequences.
First, the increasing dependence in daily life on 
a complex, distributed online infrastructure for 
mediating daily life changes the power dynam-
ics within the media industries, leading to the 
increased importance of the telecommunica-
tions industries which provide infrastructures 
of connection (Wi-Fi and broadband networks). 
Market convergence means that telecommuni-
cations providers have the power of control “in 
the last instance” over the communication sys-
tems on which all content distribution depends 
(Bolin 2011). Consider the vast scale of some 
new media infrastructure companies: Google’s 
annual revenue in 2015 was 74.5 billion USD, 
Facebook’s 17.9 billion USD, and Amazon’s 107 
billion USD.14
But the global balance is no longer one of simple 
U.S. dominance. By the end of 2014, of the top 
ten Internet companies in the world, six are U.S. 
and four are Chinese. Indeed, the growing pow-
er of China’s Internet market, with its distinc-
tive Chinese platforms (Sina’s Weibo, Tencent’s 
Wechat) is such that Shi (2015) has argued that 
cyberspace now has two camps, GAFA (Goo-
gle, Amazon, Facebook and Apple) and BATJ 
(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Jingdong). As a result, 
“the material foundation for U.S.-China co-gov-
ernance of the Internet is in shape” (Shi 2015). 
This observation was made at the 2015 World 
Internet Conference Wuzhen Summit at which 
the Chinese state’s effort promoted its goal of 
shaping the future of global Internet governance, 
a strategy with profound implications not only 
for China, but also for global communication 
politics.
Second, such developing power concentrations 
have implications for evermore sectors of every-
day life from government to health (SDG 3). Take 
also education (SDG 4): concerns are developing 
regarding school learning materials increasing-
ly provided not by the state but by commercial 
14 http://www.statista.com/
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media companies such as Apple and Google 
through initiatives such as Apple Education and 
Google for Education. Weaker welfare and pub-
lic service systems are creating opportunities for 
market advances in areas such as education that 
were not previously much commercially exploit-
ed (Forsman 2014; Selwyn 2014).
Third, none of these developments would be 
possible without a huge double development in 
media’s “infrastructures of connection”: the vast 
infrastructure of data collection and process-
ing which drives the activities of search engines 
and all sorts of digital platforms and, underpin-
ning them, the default infrastructure of “cloud 
computing” (Mosco 2014) which provides the 
capacity necessary for such data collection and 
processing, and for the general expansion of com-
puter-based information processing in everyday 
life (for example, the “Internet of Things”). Both 
developments expand what we mean by “media” 
and create new challenges for governance (see 
Section 3).
At the same time, deep inequalities of access re-
main, as noted in Section 2.2. The African con-
tinent, for example, remains characterized by 
widespread poverty, huge socioeconomic in-
equalities, and highly differentiated patterns of 
media access and use, with the central parts of 
the continent most deprived (Porter and Stern 
2015: 17, 50). Such inequalities have important 
implications for citizens’ ability to participate in 
any mediated public sphere (see Sections 4 and 
5).
 
We cannot therefore say that the “whole world” 
is being transformed by media at the same time 
and in the same way. Yet the overall direction 
of these large-scale transformations is changing 
how we think about media’s potential contribu-
tion to social progress.
3. The governance of media infrastructures
As we showed in Section 2, the global media 
landscape is complex and uneven, reflecting 
many diverse histories. The often opaque struc-
tures of media governance that have emerged in 
the digital era are another factor that complicates 
media and communications’ contribution to so-
cial progress.
3.1 The evolving relations between media 
infrastructures and government regulation 
of information flows
Governments worldwide have expressed inter-
ests in regulating media infrastructures. In some 
cases, such interests take the form of laws direct-
ly prescribing the conditions of information ac-
cess and exchange or the technical capabilities of 
media infrastructures. In others, legal incentives 
for the takedown of certain kinds of information 
produce regulatory effects.
Legal regimes in many countries protect free-
dom of expression, but all governments prohibit 
the publication and exchange of certain types of 
information. Additionally, “[m]any democra-
cies now deploy national-level filtering systems 
through which all ISPs (or in some cases most 
major ones) are compelled to block designat-
ed lists of websites to address public concerns 
about … illegal activities conducted on the In-
ternet” (MacKinnon 2012: 95). Typical subjects 
of legal prohibitions include child pornography, 
speech offering material assistance to terrorists, 
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15 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title II: Online Liability Limitation, 112 Stat. 2860, 
codified as amended at 17 USC. § 512.
16 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, No. C-131/12, 13 May 2014.
17 Constitutional Court Decision 2010Hun-Ma47, 23 August 2012.
speech that infringes intellectual property rights, 
and speech ruled to be defamatory. Additional-
ly, some countries prohibit the dissemination of 
hate speech, and many set limits on the collec-
tion, dissemination, and processing of personal 
information, although data protection regimes 
vary considerably from country to country. There 
are good reasons for all these prohibitions, but 
each involves governments in decisions about 
what is or is not prohibited, and therefore raises 
the possibility of overbroad interpretation lead-
ing to censorship of other, nominally protected 
expression. Such decisions necessarily have im-
plications for the quality of social life and the 
possibilities for social progress.
In some situations, legal rules incentivize me-
dia infrastructure companies to create no-
tice-and-takedown mechanisms for removal of 
prohibited information. To create an additional, 
more consistent set of incentives for removal, 
many countries have enacted legislation that pro-
vides safe harbour from copyright infringement 
liability if procedures are followed for removal 
of unauthorized copyright-protected materials 
from publicly available websites and/or exclusion 
of such materials from search results. The first 
copyright safe harbour legislation was enacted by 
the United States as part of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act of 1998.15 Similar provisions 
have been enacted in many other countries, often 
following inclusion of such obligations in bilater-
al or multilateral free trade agreements negotiat-
ed by the United States (Fink and Reichenmiller 
2006; see also Valdes and McCann 2014). More 
recently, European legal instruments regarding 
privacy and data protection have been inter-
preted to afford enforceable rights to deindex-
ing and erasure of information made available 
online.16 Those rulings have prompted some on-
line information providers, including most no-
tably Google, to develop notice-and-takedown 
mechanisms patterned after the copyright model 
(Powles and Chaparro 2015). Such legal struc-
tures play important roles in shaping the “rules 
of the game” regarding information flow in daily 
life.
Meanwhile, governments in some regions have 
invested heavily in the development of technol-
ogies for regulating citizens’ informational activ-
ities more directly and on highly granular levels. 
South Korea, for example, for several years en-
forced a “real-name system” for Internet access 
that prevented anonymous expression online. In 
2012, the Constitutional Court of Korea struck 
down the real-name requirements, ruling that 
they violated Internet users’ freedom of speech.17 
Automated content filtering of information sup-
plied via media infrastructures is pervasive. Such 
filtering is often justified by asserted needs that 
parallel the reasons offered for direct speech pro-
hibitions (e.g., protection against pornography, 
copyright infringement, and/or defamation and 
harassment); in operation, however, it also seeks 
to police and deny access to content for political 
reasons (MacKinnon 2012).
On another level, not just governments but cor-
porations (from Europe, North America, and 
Asia) are heavily involved in the building of me-
dia infrastructures for example through the ex-
port of technologies to the Global South. Such 
infrastructures often include built-in capacities 
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for censorship and surveillance. Chinese com-
panies export technologies similar to those de-
veloped to Communist Party specifications for 
domestic use (MacKinnon 2012). When the 
Zimbabwean government jammed shortwave 
broadcasts in the run-up to the 2005 elections, it 
was believed to have done so by using jamming 
equipment provided by China (Wu 2012). But 
North American and European companies such 
as Cisco also export information technologies 
built to customer specification to enable infor-
mational control, and global platform companies 
have acceded to demands for censorship to gain 
access to local markets (Wu 2012; Stirland 2008).
3.2 The shift from formal to informal gov-
ernance and the rise of new global/transna-
tional governance institutions
Direct government mandates, prohibitions, and 
procurements are the most obvious mechanisms 
through which media infrastructures are gov-
erned, but other mechanisms are equally import-
ant. The emergence of a networked information 
economy and the globalization of mediated in-
formation flows have catalyzed two significant 
shifts in the nature and quality of governance. 
The first is a shift away from formal government 
regulation toward informal and often highly cor-
poratized governance mechanisms. The second 
is a shift away from state-based governance (and 
global governance institutions organized around 
state membership) toward transnational gover-
nance institutions more directly responsive to 
the asserted needs of private entities, often also 
corporations, that are those institutions’ “stake-
holders”. Both trends, if they continue unabated, 
may result in a serious imbalance inconsistent 
with SDG 16, which calls for the building of “ef-
fective, accountable and inclusive institutions at 
all levels”.
Particularly in the Global North but also the 
Global South, the information networks and 
communication protocols that underlie media 
infrastructures are designed and operated by 
private, corporate entities. Direct technical au-
thority over networks and protocols gives those 
entities an authority that is inherently regulato-
ry. Global platform companies such as Google, 
Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple, each 
of which occupies a dominant market position 
globally, enjoy correspondingly stronger and 
more pervasive regulatory power.
The regulatory effects of technology take a va-
riety of forms and produce a variety of effects, 
some beneficial and others less so. For example, 
security measures designed to prevent unautho-
rized access to networks, servers, and accounts 
protect private, personal information and im-
portant corporate and government information 
from prying eyes and malicious actors. Flawed 
or poorly implemented security measures can 
introduce vulnerabilities into the network, ex-
posing individuals to identity theft, surveillance, 
censorship, and political persecution. Likewise, 
flawed or poorly implemented security mea-
sures can expose corporations, governments, 
and key power and communications infrastruc-
tures to espionage and cyberattack. But techni-
cal protections applied to media infrastructures 
and content flows can also have direct impacts 
on important aspects of social life: for example, 
affecting the information access necessary for 
education, self-development, cultural participa-
tion, informed voting, and open and democratic 
government (Citron 2008; Cohen 2012). Gover-
nance processes in relation to media infrastruc-
tures are therefore much more than a “technical” 
concern.
There are other examples of how media gover-
nance affects social life. Many platform compa-
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nies (e.g., Google/YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) 
employ filtering algorithms to remove or de-
list content that infringes copyright and related 
rights. Such automated mechanisms for content 
removal tend to be overinclusive, removing both 
material that is clearly infringing and material 
that would be covered by the various limitations 
and exceptions to copyright (Quilter and Urban 
2005; see also United Nations 2011).
In addition, many platform companies employ 
predictive algorithms to determine what infor-
mation to display to their users. In networked 
digital media and particularly for mobile appli-
cations, access to information is comprehensive-
ly mediated by such algorithms, which process 
data collected from users, often in combination 
with data purchased from other information 
collectors and aggregators, and rely on what is 
known or inferred about users to generate cor-
relations and predictions (Turow 2011; Bolin 
2011). National security services engage in simi-
lar data collection and process, often sharing the 
results with one another and helping each other 
circumvent the restrictions that might apply to 
data collection and processing conducted with-
in territorial boundaries (Privacy International 
2013). Like the filtering algorithms used for con-
tent monitoring, the predictive algorithms used 
in commercial contexts are maintained as pro-
prietary trade secrets, while their counterparts 
on the intelligence side are maintained as state 
secrets. In both cases, secrecy frustrates efforts 
to document and understand the effects of such 
filtering processes on the flow of daily life and 
on everyday freedoms (Cohen 2012; Pasquale 
2015).
The relationships between governments and the 
corporate entities that exercise alternative forms 
of governance over media infrastructures are 
complex and often contested. For governments 
seeking greater regulatory authority over media 
infrastructures, the control exercised by corpo-
rate entities presents an obvious target for reg-
ulatory intervention (Birnhack and Elkin-Koren 
2006; MacKinnon 2012; United Nations 2011). 
In China, for example, the coordination between 
state and private governance is relatively tight, 
fuelled by close ties between the state/commu-
nist party and IT conglomerates.
In North America and Europe, by contrast, the 
interplay of state and private governance mech-
anisms is more complicated. There are powerful 
pressures to comply with government demands 
for access to information for law enforcement 
and national security purposes, as the Snowden 
revelations showed. In the wake of those revela-
tions, however, some companies, including most 
notably Apple, have redesigned their products 
and services to offer users greater privacy for 
their communications with each other (though, 
as we discuss in Section 3.3, they have contin-
ued to collect other data streams for predictive 
targeting) and have more aggressively resisted 
government demands for access (Yadron 2016; 
Powles and Chaparro 2016).
Outside the law enforcement context, dynam-
ics tend to be somewhat different, and reflect a 
greater perceived alignment of state and private 
interests. For example, U.S. companies that en-
gage in collection and processing of personal 
information often count government entities 
among their customers (Hoofnagle 2004), and 
have looked to the U.S. government to protect 
their economic interests in relation to claims for 
stronger privacy and data protection regulation. 
European information companies, for their part, 
value cross-border trade but also look to the Eu-
ropean Union for protection against U.S.-based 
rivals. With regard to private economic rights in 
information, copyright safe harbour legislation 
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effectively positions corporate information busi-
nesses as the regulators of first resort. So far, how-
ever, efforts to impose in law parallel takedown 
obligations on payment providers and domain 
name system registrars have not succeeded.
The second shift described in this section – from 
state-based to transnational governance – in-
volves two types of transnational governance 
institutions: trade dispute resolution bodies and 
technical standards bodies, in both of which the 
relative regulatory influence of corporations is 
growing. The global trade system has become 
a key mechanism through which both nation 
states and powerful corporate actors pursue their 
interests in regulating media infrastructures and 
controlling information flows. Many completed 
global, regional, and bilateral trade agreements 
– and many others currently under negotiation – 
contain key provisions dealing with recognition 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
and with flows of data and information services 
across borders (Calabrese and Briziarelli 2011; 
Freedman 2003). Although trade agreements 
typically contain provisions exempting protec-
tions for public health, environmental protec-
tion, and privacy rights from designation as non-
tariff barriers, 18 the extent of those exemptions is 
unclear and their scope contested (Public Citizen 
2015a). Arbitral proceedings alleging violations 
of trade agreements therefore may work at cross 
purposes with efforts by domestic legislatures 
and courts and international human rights tri-
bunals to set appropriate limits on right-holder 
control of information and on the collection, 
processing, and use of personal information to 
sort and categorize individuals and communi-
ties.
Meanwhile, technical standards bodies have at-
tained increasing prominence and power. Net-
worked digital communications operate via 
information transfer protocols. Such protocols 
determine the resources to which individuals 
and communities have access and, depending 
on their design, may enable particular types of 
surveillance or afford bottlenecks at which state 
or corporate regulatory authority can be brought 
to bear (DeNardis 2014; MacKinnon 2012). 
Those protocols are the responsibility of an in-
terlocking network of global standards bodies, 
including the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), the Internet Corporation for As-
signed Names and Numbers (ICANN), and the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). These 
bodies have different charges and varying de-
grees of connection to more traditional gover-
nance institutions.
For example, the ITU, which oversees standard-
ization and implementation of a variety of pro-
tocols for telecommunication, broadcasting, and 
data transfer, is overseen by the United Nations 
and representation is state-based, whereas the 
ICANN, which oversees the Internet naming and 
addressing protocols and maintains a dispute 
resolution system for resolving trademark-relat-
ed domain name disputes, is a standalone corpo-
rate body chartered under the laws of California, 
with policies set by an elected board of directors.
In these multiple ways, the ability of national 
governments, and indirectly national civil so-
cieties, to influence the workings of media in 
18 See, for example, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX: General Exceptions, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXX; 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV: General Exceptions, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gats_02_e.htm#article14.
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everyday life (through governance structures) 
has been challenged by the cross-cutting abil-
ity of corporate interests to impose governance 
through other means. In considering the poten-
tial implications of media for social progress we 
need therefore to take into account this underly-
ing shift in regulatory power.
3.3 The ambiguous implications of me-
dia-based governance for social progress
For citizens, networked digital media infrastruc-
tures may lower the costs of access to knowl-
edge and enable new forms of participation in 
social, cultural, and economic life (see Section 
5). At the same time, however, citizens’ access to 
many important informational and cultural re-
sources is subject to control by neo-authoritarian 
states and by information intermediaries of var-
ious sorts, including Internet access providers, 
search engines, mobile applications developers, 
and designers of proprietary media ecosystems. 
Such control often materially affects the level 
and quality of access. The implications for social 
progress are clearest when particular materials 
are blocked or removed, but mediated access 
also produces a range of other effects, which may 
or may not be consistent with SDG 9 concern-
ing the construction of “resilient infrastructures” 
and the promotion of “inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization”.
The increasingly global regime for intellectual 
property protection both incentivizes worldwide 
distribution of informational and cultural re-
sources and creates additional barriers for those 
seeking access to such resources. As already sug-
gested in Section 2.5, licensing requirements for 
access to educational, professional, and technical 
materials can be onerous and the need to pay re-
curring fees for continued access to digitalized 
resources (rather than, for example, purchasing 
hard copies to which one may enjoy permanent 
access) disproportionately burdens public insti-
tutions and lower-resourced communities. In 
the Global South, the costs of access to copy-
righted materials can render access infeasible 
even for educational institutions and libraries 
(Chon 2007; Okediji 2004, 2006). In addition, 
a 1967 Berne Convention protocol governing 
translation rights is not widely used because its 
protections are difficult for developing countries 
to invoke. Among other things, the protocol re-
quires that a compulsory licensing system be 
fully implemented in domestic law and does not 
make adequate provision for minority languag-
es.19 The Global South has adopted a variety of ad 
hoc solutions, but the lack of a clear framework 
often stymies efforts to make informational and 
cultural works available to global audiences that 
are linguistically and culturally diverse (Cerda 
Silva 2012).
In many parts of the world and for large parts of 
the population, everyday life routinely involves 
online access to a wide variety of purveyors of 
news, information, and popular culture, as well 
as search engines, social networking platforms, 
and other content aggregators that seek to help 
users find, organize, and make sense of it all. 
Access to these resources may be offered at no 
financial cost to users on an advertiser-support-
ed basis, but often such access has a price, in the 
form of the automated collection of information 
about personal reading, viewing, and listening 
habits (Hoofnagle and Whittington 2014). Such 
information can be used both to target advertis-
19 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Appendix art. II, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698#P421_79913.
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ing and to suggest content more likely to appeal 
to each user.
Such predictive targeting of information access 
has a number of troubling economic and polit-
ical implications. Algorithms for predictive tar-
geting based on data about personal habits and 
preferences necessarily enable the identification 
of population segments sorted by, for example, 
race/nationality, cultural background, religious 
affiliation, socioeconomic status, and political 
preferences. Commercially, targeting based on 
such indicators raises the prospect of invidious 
discrimination in the distribution of goods and 
services, in decisions about employment and 
credit, and in myriad other ways (Barocas and 
Selbst 2016; Robinson and Yu 2014). The ability 
to conduct relatively granular price discrimina-
tion over those goods and services, in ways that 
deprive ordinary individuals of choice and cor-
responding marketplace leverage, sits in tension 
with free-market ideologies and raises profound 
distributive justice questions (Cohen 2015).
Turning to politics, microtargeting of media con-
tent and political appeals that align with (infer-
ences about) recipients’ preexisting inclinations 
creates the prospect of an “echo chamber” or “fil-
ter bubble” effect, through which preexisting in-
clinations become reinforced and public opinion 
about political and cultural issues becomes cor-
respondingly polarized (Sunstein 2009; Pariser 
2011).20 Individuals themselves can come to rely 
on filtering processes to simplify the information 
environment and reduce information overload 
(Andrejevic 2013). In an era in which descrip-
tions of policy problems increasingly are subject 
to expert mediation – as with climate change or 
the global financial crisis – the filter bubble ef-
fect can work to entrench beliefs in ways that are 
highly resistant to scientific challenge or debunk-
ing (Andrejevic 2013: 12-18, 42-61, 113-32). This 
can undermine efforts to mobilize popular and 
political support for action toward social prog-
ress on various fronts (environmental sustain-
ability, financial accountability, and so on).
A final set of ambiguities concerns the newly 
prominent transnational governance institutions 
described in Section 3.2. Governance of media 
infrastructures and information flows via trade 
and technical standards bodies provides har-
monization that many argue is essential in an 
increasingly interconnected world. But the new 
transnational governance institutions are ac-
countable neither to national governments nor to 
traditional international governance institutions, 
and many lack robust democratic traditions of 
their own. Participation in such institutions may 
be perceived as offering opportunities for power-
ful national and/or commercial interests to avoid 
roadblocks interposed by domestic regulation, 
by the international human rights framework, 
and by civil society groups (Benvenisti 2015). 
Within the global trade system, both negotia-
tion and dispute resolution processes are highly 
responsive to corporate interests yet much less 
responsive to other interests. Trade dispute res-
olution panels convened by the World Trade Or-
ganisation have, to date, ruled against states as-
serting protective regulation in all but one of the 
cases in which domestic protective regulations 
have been challenged (Public Citizen 2015a). 
In recent rounds of negotiation over high-pro-
file multilateral agreements such as the Trans 
Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade 
20 In the United States, practices of political microtargeting are becoming widespread. See Lois Beckett, “How Companies 
Have Assembled Political Profiles for Millions of Internet Users,” ProPublica, Oct. 22, 2012, https://www.propublica.
org/article/how-companies-have-assembled-political-profiles-for-millions-of-Internet-us.
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and Investment Partnership, trade associations 
representing corporate interests have enjoyed 
privileged access to country-level negotiators 
and working drafts, while civil society groups 
and interested members of the public have been 
allowed only brief glimpses of later-stage docu-
ments, and only on condition of confidentiality.21 
Technical standards bodies, meanwhile, are only 
gradually coming to terms with their own role 
as governance bodies (DeNardis 2009; DeNardis 
2014; MacKinnon 2012: 203-19).
The result is a landscape of everyday media con-
sumption configured by forces that are increas-
ingly in tension with shared flows of information 
and open, inclusive development. The multiple 
overlapping processes for governing media’s un-
derlying infrastructures are ever more secretive 
and resistant to civil society influence. This is 
the complex starting-point for thinking about 
two important potential contributions of me-
dia and communications to social progress: the 
role of journalism in the production of public 
knowledge (Section 4) and the role of networked 
communications in enabling new forms of citi-
zenship (Section 5).
4. Journalism and public knowledge
21 See, for example, Howard Schneider, “Trade Deals a Closely Held Secret, Shared by More than 500 Advisers,” Washing-
ton Post, 28 Feb. 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trade-deals-a-closely-held-secret-shared-
by-more-than-500-advisers/2014/02/28/7daa65ec-9d99-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html; Phillip Inman, “MPs Can 
View TTIP Files—But Take Only Pencil and Paper with Them,” The Guardian, 18 Feb. 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/business/2016/feb/18/mps-can-view-ttip-files-but-take-only-pencil-and-paper-with-them.
One key way in which media can contribute to 
social progress over the long-term is through the 
provision of public knowledge (Sen 1999). The 
term “public knowledge” refers to the resources 
that citizens have for forming informed opin-
ions about matters of public and general interest. 
Journalism has for centuries been a key institu-
tional form for disseminating such knowledge.
4.1 Public knowledge for democracy and 
social progress
Digital media infrastructures create new oppor-
tunities for the dissemination of public knowl-
edge. Although the decline in civic participation 
in established democratic societies has been 
widely lamented (Putnam 2000), other observers 
(Lewis, Inthorn and Wahl-Jorgensen 2005; Dahl-
gren 2009) have pointed to the growth of new 
communities online and the growth in quantity 
and diversity in communication platforms out-
side of the traditional news media, where citi-
zens can exchange information and participate 
in political debate. Additionally, whereas pub-
lic knowledge traditionally was disseminated 
through news and information in the press, ra-
dio, and television, social networking platforms 
are becoming a major news source for citizens. 
A recent survey conducted in the United States 
found that 44% of respondents get their daily 
news from social media (IPSP 2017). The ques-
tion of citizenship is complex, and cannot be 
dealt with at length here: we note however that 
large parts of the world’s population live with-
out citizenship, and citizenship in a nation-state 
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does not protect citizens from rights-affecting 
actions controlled by institutions outside of the 
nation-state.
Early research on public knowledge overempha-
sized news distribution and correspondingly 
undervalued other sources of information, such 
as popular culture and entertainment (Corner 
1991). Both sources of information can contrib-
ute to the formation of public knowledge and to 
social progress, as can be appreciated when we 
consider the political and cultural aspects of cit-
izenship. Where political citizenship deals with 
issues related to the formal rights (and duties) 
of citizens, and is most often mediated by tra-
ditional categories of news about current affairs 
and politics, cultural citizenship deals with ques-
tions of recognition, identity, and the cultural 
rights (and duties) of citizens, and is mediated by 
various sorts of information that circulate in the 
cultural public sphere.
The distinction between political and cultural 
citizenship may become more blurred when the 
convergence of entertainment media and politi-
cal citizenship is taken seriously (Hermes 2005; 
Van Zoonen 2005; Williams and Delli Carpini 
2011). The rise of bots and algorithmic manage-
ment of information introduces additional dis-
tortions of public deliberation (Tambini 2017). 
But none of this potential to create public knowl-
edge matters if media content produced by an 
elite “professional” class of journalists does not 
resonate with audiences’ everyday lived experi-
ence. Today various factors point in that direc-
tion, both in forms of propaganda and destabi-
lizing communicative practices and in problems 
within systems of education, where much of the 
socializing of citizens take place (SPI “Access to 
basic knowledge”).
In this section we outline, first, the special roles 
that journalism plays in public knowledge, and 
so why journalism is important for democracy 
and social progress. We will then give examples 
of the various “soft” and “hard” threats that we 
identify as detrimental to public knowledge, in-
cluding both changes in business models, news 
reception, and new forms of “information man-
agement,” and, more directly, various physical 
threats against news production, and journal-
ists in conflict areas and unstable democracies. 
Thirdly, we will point to areas where there are 
opportunities for countering this negative pic-
ture, for example the rise of citizen journalism 
and alternative media. We end this section with 
a double case study of organized attempts to con-
struct alternative journalistic narratives in Latin 
America and the Middle East.
4.2 The special functions of journalism and 
journalistic practice
Journalism is still associated, especially in the 
established democracies of the Global North, 
with the institutions and practices of democracy 
(Fenton 2010: 3). There are many examples, both 
historical and current, of how journalism has 
contributed to public knowledge for social prog-
ress (SDG 16). These include, for example: the 
antislavery campaigns that benefited from press 
assistance with the formation of abolitionist or-
ganizations (King and Haveman 2008), samizdat 
publications in the former Soviet Union (Feld-
brugge 1975), information about environmental 
disasters such as the 2011 Fukushima nuclear ac-
cident that was spread not only by mainstream 
journalists but also by citizens on blogging and 
social media platforms (Friedman 2011) or the 
role of the underground press in the struggle 
against apartheid (Switzer and Adhikari 2000). 
For these reasons the contribution of journalism 
to public knowledge remains an important refer-
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ence point in the broader context of global social 
progress.
The emergence of digital media infrastructures 
has had profound implications for traditional 
conceptions of news and journalism. These in-
clude a proliferation of the channels through 
which journalism is produced and consumed, 
and a blurring of the lines between news and en-
tertainment through the rise of formats such as 
the “mockumentary,” “docudrama,” and satirical 
news. The participatory potential of digital tech-
nologies, aided by the widespread accessibility of 
technologies such as the mobile phone, has chal-
lenged previous claims by professional journal-
ists to exclusivity in the purveying of news. Addi-
tionally, the business models for journalism have 
undergone a fundamental transformation in re-
cent years, even as new opportunities have arisen 
for the creation of public knowledge and citizen 
participation in the construction of knowledge 
and public debate.
Against the background of rapid change, how-
ever, the expectation that news journalism will 
contribute to public knowledge, the monitoring 
of power and the facilitation of public debate 
remains an ideal against which communication 
practices continue to be measured. The mere 
fact that information is publicly disseminated 
and available does not automatically result in an 
informed public. Additionally, in the context of 
changing frameworks of reception, citizens’ abil-
ity to orientate themselves in today’s increasingly 
complex media landscape, drawing perhaps on 
the skills provided by education, are ever more 
important.
4.3 Threats to public knowledge 1: system 
pressures
The digitization and marketization of media 
(discussed in Section 2) have affected the insti-
tutional conditions for journalistic production. 
New economic conditions have led the news 
industries into a downward spiral where it has 
become ever difficult to charge for content. In a 
recent survey conducted by the IPSP in the Unit-
ed States, 57% of respondents do not like to pay 
for news, and believe news should be freely ac-
cessible to all (IPSP 2017). Shrinking readership 
makes advertisers abandon print media to the 
benefit of online search and social networking.
The old business models of journalism are col-
lapsing, and news producers have had to rethink 
their relation to audiences, leading in turn to 
changes in journalistic practice. New forms of 
“click-bait journalism,” robot journalism, and 
algorithmically steered news production are in-
creasingly common. These follow different logics 
from traditional journalism, and in their most 
extreme forms may produce echo chambers or 
filter bubbles (see Section 3) that in the long run 
fragment public debate and the public sphere 
more generally. The automated search for audi-
ences through data processing also may further 
marginalize those audiences who are already on 
the margins of the public sphere. In countries 
where access to the digital public sphere mir-
rors huge social and economic equalities – for 
instance South Africa, India, China, and Brazil 
– these new practices could exacerbate such in-
equalities.
The reorganization of media production into 
large-scale media corporations with interests 
also in nonjournalistic media production has 
meant that even financially successful journalis-
tic and public knowledge operations cannot al-
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ways reinvest their profits into news production, 
but instead have their profits reinvested in other 
activities. This lack of economic control makes it 
difficult to sustain long-term strategies of news 
production. While there has always been a ten-
sion between editorial and management teams 
within news organizations, large-scale media 
corporations shift economic decision-making 
farther away from news production environ-
ments, resulting in managerial decisions that di-
rect journalistic practice from the outside.
There are also regulative threats to independent 
news media production, for example the non-
commercial and license fee funded public ser-
vice media. In Europe, the traditional freedom 
of public service broadcasters to choose their 
policy orientations has come under attack by 
newly powerful private broadcasters (SPI “Press 
freedom”). One result is the public value test in-
stigated by the European Commission, which 
emerged from private broadcasters’ intense lob-
bying efforts in relation to the European Com-
mission (Donders and Moe 2011).
While online (including mobile) media have cre-
ated new platforms for social agency and public 
participation, both in the creation of “user-gen-
erated content” (UGC) for mainstream media 
and in providing outlets for alternative news 
and views, the Internet has also become a space 
where reactionary views, racist representations 
and hate speech can thrive. Social media like 
Facebook and Twitter contribute to the prolifer-
ation of this kind of communication. Misunder-
standings of complex matters and online “lynch 
mobs” illustrate the volatility of networked dig-
ital media environments and offer testimony to 
the limits of social media for public debate. On 
a more fundamental level, well-meaning educa-
tional initiatives to foster “digital literacy” might 
produce relativistic approaches to scientific and 
social truths (Boyd 2017), and the journalis-
tic ideals of balance of opinion might privilege 
a blurring of the distinction between facts and 
opinions, and where “truth” becomes more of an 
affective mood.
4.4 Threats to public knowledge 2: coercive 
force
Meanwhile, journalists can face harder forms of 
threat, whether through legal frameworks (press 
freedom or its opposite) or informal threats 
(through damage to journalists’ physical and 
psychological security): these threats may exist 
separately or in combination.
In many parts of the world, growing political in-
stability has affected journalism’s ability to fulfil 
its broader public knowledge goals because of 
direct threats to press freedom (see SPI “Press 
Freedom”). For example, in some parts of Eastern 
Europe, political polarization has arisen as some 
post-Soviet states have sought closer ties with the 
EU. The Ukraine-Russia conflict is one, widely 
reported, outgrowth of this polarization, but the 
phenomenon is also visible in other post-Soviet 
countries (Richter 2015). Information warfare is 
on the rise, not only in the region itself, but also 
in international news media (for example, via 
TV channels such as Russia Today and Ukraine 
Today (Miazhevich 2014)). Initiatives for disin-
formation and propaganda/counterpropaganda, 
including so-called “troll-factories” maintained 
in Russia (and elsewhere),22 make efforts to en-
hance public knowledge increasingly difficult. 
22 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/18/trolls-putin-russia-savchuk or http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house
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The sheer amount of seemingly contradictory 
information circulating puts high pressure on 
audiences’ critical abilities (the much discussed 
phenomenon of “fake news”). A recent example 
of this from the Ukraine-Russia conflict is the 
overload of contradictory information that sur-
rounded the shooting down of Malaysian flight 
MH17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014, and the 
sharply divergent accounts that circulated on the 
Internet both before and after the Dutch Safety 
Board published their report of the crash.23 Sim-
ilar dynamics have emerged in the Middle East, 
leading to an increasingly polarized and pro-
paganda-dominated public sphere (see Section 
4.6).
In many African countries also, journalism for 
public knowledge remains an ideal rather than 
a practical reality. In the Windhoek Declaration 
on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic 
African Press (UNESCO 1991), African jour-
nalists invoked the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights as a motivation for the promotion of 
press freedom. At the same time, however, Af-
rican resistance to colonialism and rejection of 
cultural imperialism engendered an insistence 
on “African values” in journalism, couched in 
the discourse of development but often implying 
uncritical and loyalist media support of postco-
lonial states. An example of an appeal to “African 
values” is Francis Kasoma’s (1994, 1996) notion 
of “Afriethics,” which rejects Western normative 
frameworks and counterposes an African value 
system that privileges communalism and an ori-
entation towards the family and clan over indi-
vidualism. Appeals to “African values” have often 
been criticized for their tendency to essentialize 
African culture and identity, without acknowl-
edging the interpenetration of African and West-
ern values in a globalized context (Banda 2009; 
Skjerdal 2012). Additionally, such appeals have 
served to justify repression of media freedom 
in many African countries (see Bourgault 1995; 
Karikari 2007).
Lastly, against the background of political in-
stability, propaganda wars, and state repression, 
violence against journalists has also increased. 
Some examples include: Egypt clamping down 
on journalists, activists, and civil society; the 
consolidation of electoral autocracy and tempo-
rary closure of digital platforms in Turkey; and 
repressive measures from verbal threats to physi-
cal assaults and imprisonment in various African 
countries. In Poland, a new legal regime has cir-
cumscribed the freedom for journalists, making 
critical and investigative journalism more diffi-
cult and precarious.24
4.5 Opportunities for public knowledge: 
new forms of journalism and citizens’ me-
dia
Meanwhile, digital media infrastructures have 
enabled the growth of new forms of citizen-cre-
ated media for the production of public knowl-
edge. In many African contexts where legacy 
media like newspapers and radio stations are 
owned and controlled by the state, digital media 
platforms have served as alternative outlets for 
the dissemination of news, political debate and 
critique (Paterson 2013). In Zimbabwe, Face-
book has provided users with more freedom to 
engage in political satire and offer alternative 
accounts of political developments (Mare 2014). 
The widespread penetration and use of mobile 
media in Africa have also provided users with 
23 See http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/
24 See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35257105.
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a tool to engage more actively with mainstream 
news agendas. An example of this was the mobile 
phone footage of police brutality against a Mo-
zambican immigrant, Mido Macia, in Daveyton, 
South Africa. The footage of police dragging Ma-
cia, cuffed to a police vehicle, was captured by a 
bystander and sent to the tabloid the Daily Sun, 
who posted the video online and reported on 
it. The video went viral and made headlines in-
ternationally after Macia died in police custody, 
and led to the arrest and conviction of the police 
officers. This integration of citizen journalism, 
legacy media (especially tabloids), and online 
platforms such as Youtube or Facebook, has pro-
vided journalists and news consumers with new 
ways of creating public knowledge and serving 
the public interest.
In South Korea, citizen journalists have used 
digital networks for producing alternative civic 
discourses and for mobilizing enormous rallies 
of citizens to speak out on socially sensitive is-
sues. More recently, social media have given rise 
to new alternative media such as Newstapa (“Re-
building Investigative Journalism”) launched in 
January 2012. Due to the government’s control 
over public broadcasting, some former employ-
ees of the major TV networks and other small-
sized production team members have come to-
gether to produce an investigative news program 
about social issues. Newstapa uses a variety of on-
line outlets such as its own webpage views, You-
Tube clips, and podcast episodes, and the young-
er generations download and watch its weekly 
episodes using their smartphones. Social media 
also play a key role in spreading the news pro-
gram’s schedule and in enabling public fundrais-
ing to support production. Newstapa has gained 
a reputation as an influential news provider and 
as illustrating how, through regular practices of 
collaboration, citizens can build alternative para-
digms of social justice against mainstream media 
and power elites.
Meanwhile, during the political turmoil and vi-
olence following the ousting of former President 
Yanukovich in Ukraine, faculty and students 
from the Mohyla School of Journalism in Kyiv 
created StopFake (stopfake.org), an organization 
aimed at debunking Russian propaganda and the 
distorted news produced by troll-factories. An-
other civic initiative formed during the political 
turmoil was The Ukraine Crisis Media Centre, 
which is a platform for information management 
that arranges press briefings with representatives 
of the Ukrainian military and government (Bolin 
et al. 2016).
*      *      *      *      *
There are therefore many overlapping factors 
shaping media’s possible contribution to public 
knowledge in different parts of the world today. 
In the next part of this section, we offer a double 
case study from Latin America and the Middle 
East that considers the possibilities of building 
new infrastructures for journalism that can offer 
alternative voices to counter perceived dominant 
narratives.
4.6 Double case study: TeleSUR and Al-Ja-
zeera: Alternative voices in global news
The Venezuelan channel TeleSUR and the Qatari 
channel Al-Jazeera are often hailed as models of 
media with global reach that have challenged the 
North Atlantic domination of global news flows 
and reference-points. These two channels have 
much in common: they were both made possible 
by the large political ambitions of their founders; 
both faced indifference or hostility in the world’s 
power centers; and both evolved from single 
channels into multiplatform networks. This sec-
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tion explores what can be learned from their 
contrasting achievements.
TeleSUR
Sponsored by the left-leaning government of 
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999 – 2013), Tele-
SUR was formed in 2005 as a regional television 
network with the goal of broadcasting “from the 
South to the South” (Da Silva Mendes 2012). Te-
leSUR’s achievements can only be understood 
against the history of media concentration and 
economic exploitation achieved by elites in Latin 
America since the eighteenth century. From the 
inception of electronic media, upper classes have 
controlled the media and used them to advance 
their own political and financial interests, at the 
exclusion of the interests of working class major-
ities. Through control of commercial and pub-
lic media, political and economic elites secured 
ideological control over, and the opportunity to 
profit, from mass audiences.
Former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez cre-
ated TeleSUR as a television network that would 
prioritize the information and communication 
needs of the oppressed majorities in the region 
and disseminate an autonomous Latin American 
perspective. Drawing explicitly from the lan-
guage of the NWICO, TeleSUR defines itself as 
“a Latin American multimedia initiative dedicat-
ed to promoting unity among the peoples of the 
South; a space and a voice for the development of 
a new communication order” (www.teleSURtv.
net). It defines “the South” as a “geopolitical 
concept that promotes the people’s struggle for 
peace and self-determination and respect for hu-
man rights and social justice”. TeleSUR has had 
two different goals: to offer an alternative to U.S. 
and European news media, (e.g., BBC or CNN); 
and to shape a unified Latin American public 
sphere (Cañizalez and Lugo 2007). It is not a co-
incidence that TeleSUR emerged in 2005 at the 
same time that the region shifted to the left. Its 
slogan – “Nuestro norte es el Sur” (Our North is 
the South) – embodies this shift in perspective, 
and is evidenced by its coverage of key historical 
events such as the bombardment of Colombian 
FARC guerrilla camps by the military, or the de-
mise of Gaddafi’s government in Libya.
TeleSUR is cofinanced by various governments 
in Latin America (Da Silva Mendes 2012). Some 
Latin American analysts suggest that TeleSUR is 
more the loudspeaker of “Chavismo” (the polit-
ical platform of late Venezuelan president Hugo 
Chávez) than a pan-Latin American voice (Mo-
raes 2011), but TeleSUR makes an important 
contribution to public knowledge: information 
and news make up 80% of TeleSUR’s program-
ming and the rest centers on renowned Latin 
American personalities (Da Silva Mendes 2012; 
Rincón in press). In 2009 TeleSUR grew into a 
multimedia platform with a strong presence on-
line and its own distribution system. TeleSUR 
currently has five satellites covering parts of 
Europe and the Americas, as well as the Middle 
East and North Africa.
Al-Jazeera
Al-Jazeera, the original Arabic-language chan-
nel, was formed in late 1996, following the break-
up of BBC Arabic. It was founded by Hamad 
bin-Khalifa Al Thani to free Qatar from the in-
fluence of its larger neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and 
give the country a regional and global influence 
disproportionate to its small size.
Al-Jazeera’s unbridled news coverage quickly 
offended Arab leaders accustomed to deference 
and Western powers unused to having their nar-
ratives of global affairs challenged. By early 2004, 
the government of Qatar had received more than 
34
500 complaints from Arab governments focus-
ing on Al-Jazeera (Lamloum 2004: 20). Original-
ly hailed as a beacon of free speech by the West, 
Al-Jazeera became vilified as the loudspeaker of 
Al-Qaeda following the September 11, 2001 at-
tacks. The channel became a global household 
name in the wake of the Anglo-American inva-
sions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, 
when its deep coverage was reused by Western 
news organizations.
In the following years, Al-Jazeera grew from a 
single channel to a network of multiple channels, 
including Al-Jazeera English, a training cen-
ter, and online platforms. The Arabic-language 
Al-Jazeera’s editorial line was sympathetic to the 
centrist Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, to 
the Palestinian cause, and to the Global South. 
Some of these issues carried over into Al-Jazeera 
English, whose editorial line has significant over-
lap with TeleSUR’s. Al-Jazeera English became a 
major global news player, with broadcast bureaus 
in Doha, London, New York and Kuala Lumpur, 
and dozens of offices and correspondents world-
wide. Al-Jazeera however faced problems from 
its inception regarding repeated political pres-
sure to restrain its editorial line, internal fric-
tions (Zahreddin 2011), and a conflict between 
two factions – one secular and Arab nationalist, 
the other Islamist and sympathetic to the Mus-
lim Brotherhood (Kraidy and Khalil 2009; Talon 
2011).
Al-Jazeera shifted its editorial line with the onset 
of the Arab uprisings in 2010. In Egypt, the chan-
nel supported the Muslim Brotherhood against 
Mubarak. In Syria, it also sided with the rebels 
against Assad. Although Al-Jazeera and Qatar 
gained some ground as a supporter of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, ensuing political shifts, driv-
en by rapprochement between Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia, undermined Al-Jazeera’s status as a news 
outlet that challenged dominant news agendas.
*      *      *      *      *
The contrasting cases of TeleSUR and Al-Jazeera 
illustrate both the opportunities for and the po-
tential vulnerabilities of attempts to create pub-
lic knowledge outlets from outside the Global 
North that have influence on a global scale. Such 
outlets can be established and have significant 
success, provided strong initial funding and sup-
port exists, but they remain vulnerable to the 
wider political influences that may lie behind 
their funding. That vulnerability however should 
not be seen in isolation from the vulnerabilities 
to political influence that commercially-funded 
media outlets also face in many other parts of the 
world.
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We have argued in Section 4 that media’s poten-
tial contribution to social progress through pub-
lic knowledge faces significant threats but, in a 
digital age characterized by an increasingly glob-
al media infrastructure, brings important op-
portunities too. In this section, we consider how 
citizens make use of the informational and imag-
inative materials that media provide to them.
5.1 Relations between media and spaces of 
citizenship
Today’s new density of global communication 
not only enables continuous interaction across 
world regions, but also is beginning to shape new 
spheres of civic communication on every scale. 
Communication interfaces (from WhatsApp to 
WeChat) offer a new architecture of civic dis-
course that is no longer merely national or in-
ternational: the resulting spaces where citizens 
interact are shaped not by the media spheres of 
particular territories but by individuals’ choic-
es of what to follow online. Furthermore, these 
networked spheres of civil communication are 
no longer accessible only in the Global North 
but engage citizens – with Internet access – from 
all types of societies, including so-called failed 
states. Through this, media become involved in 
opening up new spaces of citizenship (SDG 16.7).
Although citizenship is national and the bound-
edness of state territory continues, communi-
cation is shaping a new form of civic identity, 
which is increasingly embedded in a globalized 
digital space. Rather than globalization operat-
ing outside and against the national, “the nation 
is the site of globalization” (Sassen 2007: 80, add-
ed emphasis). Today this merging of national 
and global takes different shapes in different so-
cieties. Even secluded states such as North Korea 
and failed states such as Syria, Somalia and Af-
ghanistan have their own modes of nation-based 
globalization. However, the point is particularly 
important in relation to public civic communi-
cation where national and global public spheres 
merge, and public deliberations, legitimacy, and 
accountability no longer develop solely through 
national debates. Rather, in contexts of climate 
change, governments are held accountable based 
on broader global discourses.
As with the history of media (Section 2), these 
developments are still mainly considered from 
the perspective of nations in the Global North, 
with narratives often not looking beyond West-
ern communications theory and research (Fari-
var 2011). Similarly, accounts of diaspora’s use of 
media often ignore political connectivity between 
expatriates of the Global South that link back to 
civic discourse in their countries of origin. The 
roles of nongovernmental actors in failed states 
and civic communications in postconflict reso-
lution constitute other examples of new forms of 
connection between citizens across borders. Cit-
izens of the Global South such as forced migrants 
are communicating outside national media terri-
tories (Witteborn 2015). Networks of activism, 
deliberation, and mobilization, not possible in 
the past, are emerging whereby media provide 
new infrastructures of citizenship as part of what 
the MacBride report called the “many voices” of 
“one world”.
Section 2 discussed the historical dominance of 
communication flows from the Global North, 
linked to colonial communication infrastruc-
tures and extended by satellite communication 
infrastructures emerging in the 1970s for the 
delivery of broadcasting content and, since the 
5. Networked communications: possibilities for citizenship
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1990s, for individual media reception. For most 
of the twentieth century, the globalized “stretch-
ing” of human interactions through media – the 
“intensification of worldwide social relations 
which link distant localities in such a way that 
local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 1990: 
64) – was, in its framing, dominated by news 
channels from the Global North, such as BBC, 
CNN, and Deutsche Welle, with few opportuni-
ties to contest it.
This situation has changed significantly since the 
second half of the 1990s due to three interrelated 
processes: the emergence of digital satellite plat-
forms enabling the delivery of no longer just a 
few but hundreds of channels, the reduction of 
uplink costs for broadcasters, and the availability 
of cheap direct-to-home roof-top dishes. Fur-
thermore, and most importantly, new regional 
media players have challenged the monopoly of 
political “breaking news” in times of world con-
flict. Such news is often delivered “live” world-
wide and has influenced national foreign policy 
imperatives in various countries (Volkmer 1999; 
Robinson 2005), contesting the framing of world 
events by media corporations from the Glob-
al North (see also Section 4.6). Whereas CNN 
produced the only narrative of the first Gulf War 
(1990-1991) for a world audience, now there 
are hundreds of satellite news channels from 
the wider Arabic region, from Sudan, Pakistan, 
Tanzania, and at least fifty channels dedicated to 
news from India, South Korea, China, Mexico, 
and Brazil. In addition, some regionwide news 
channels, such as Channel News Asia and Africa 
24, are available in several languages and target 
neighboring regions.
The resulting digital ecology for civic participa-
tion has two additional key characteristics. The 
first is the increasingly complex flow of media 
and information organized not just by media 
organizations, but by citizens’ own efforts to up-
load or recirculate what interests them. It is a 
transnational public space, which enables a new 
density of communication between citizens. The 
results of such dense peer-to-peer civic com-
munication may include attempts to influence 
individuals through hate speech (Phillips 2015), 
fake news and “bots” (see IPSP Chapter 10; IPSP 
Chapter 13 Toolkit “Knowledge as Commons” 
Column 2). At the same time, new forms of “re-
flective interdependence” (Volkmer 2014) may 
emerge whereby, through the sharing of refer-
ence-points across borders, citizens acquire a 
new basis for shared political debate or activism 
on topics ranging from climate change, human 
rights violations and crisis communication to 
political campaigns such as the “Occupy” move-
ment. Under these new conditions, civic engage-
ment no longer occurs in one “place,” but across 
a network of places.
Although only a minority of the population is 
engaged in these new global networks, “their 
contribution to democracy cannot be underes-
timated” (Frere and Kiyindou 2009:77, 79). In 
many countries, state monopolies on the inflow 
of foreign news are no longer possible. For exam-
ple, it can be argued that African governments 
have “hardly any grip on the choices of the Inter-
net user-consumer, who can freely choose the in-
formation that is interesting or useful and decide 
to join a particular ‘virtual community’” (Frere 
and Kiyindou 2009: 78). This flexibility in the re-
sources available through online media, includ-
ing information and deliberation accessed across 
borders (Bohman 2007), changes potentially cit-
izens’ horizons of civic engagement.
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5.2 New forms of communicative citizen-
ship: the case of global youth
As an example of these emerging trends, young 
citizens in many countries are engaging with 
each other in unprecedented ways, in peer-to-
peer interaction within and across borders. In 
order to assess the implications of these new dig-
ital ecologies for civic identity, we need to con-
sider the interaction between local and global 
media practices and information flows.
The density of these interactions is revealed in 
an international comparative study on “Global 
Youth and Media, Notions of Cosmopolitanism 
in the Global Public Space” (discussed in Volk-
mer 2014). The study included more than 6,000 
14-17 year olds in nine countries on five conti-
nents. The study asked how these young people 
use media, how they construct globalization 
and perceive civic identity. The distinctive uses 
of local, national and global media by particular 
generations have been little researched. While 
national television is the general population’s 
preferred medium for political news, young peo-
ple find news in parallel ways through Google 
news, MSN, and Yahoo. Across all society types, 
this younger generation mixes local and global 
information flows in a distinctive way that en-
titles them to the label of “in-betweeners”. As a 
result, they consider themselves between scepti-
cism and trust, between a realistic appreciation 
of global risks (indeed a strong sense of world 
insecurity) and the need for leadership. When 
asked if they feel that the world today has become 
more insecure since their parents were young, 
80% agree. Yet more than half consider interna-
tional political events more important than na-
tional and so seem to live out their citizenship on 
two connected scales, national and global. They 
distrust politicians and engage in global political 
spheres characterized by global themes such as 
“environment,” “human rights,” and “economy, 
wealth, and poverty”.
A Mexican sociologist describes in the context 
of Central America the implications of such an 
engagement for local citizenship: “the protest 
movements with a global reach, and the pres-
ence of leadership of young people in them, 
bring to mind the emergence of a new political 
cosmopolitanism among youth. Its native land is 
the world, and its strength lies in its (seeming) 
absence of structure, its intermittence and the 
multiple nodes in which its utopia is anchored” 
(Reguillo 2009: 34). In this analysis Central 
America’s young generation is both “disconnect-
ed and unequal” and “well situated, connected, 
and globalized” and increasingly engaged in 
national and transnational youth publics (Re-
guillo 2009: 23). Other regions provide further 
evidence of youth agency converging around 
local networks of publicity in Cairo (Arvizu 
2009: 387), Tanzania (Tufte and Enghel 2009), 
and Chile (Munoz-Navarro 2009). In Kenya and 
other parts of the Global South, media provide 
platforms for youth to interact and participate in 
political debates worldwide, leading one analyst 
to comment that, for the Kenyan diaspora, social 
media is an “integral aspect [of] Kenya’s social 
and political dynamics” (Mukhongo 2014).
However, the implications of these emerging 
forms of public engagement in regional media 
cultures require more attention. For example, in 
Central Asia, urban youth are drawing increas-
ingly on global sources of information and so 
“are increasingly judging the worldviews and be-
haviours of parents, teachers, political elites and 
other traditional authority figures against that 
global context … they are suddenly able to com-
pare themselves with anyone, anywhere” (Ibold 
2010:532). As anticipated by Joshua Meyrowitz 
three decades ago (Meyrowitz 1985), but now 
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on a global, not national, scale, media flows can 
work to challenge knowledge barriers and desta-
bilize relations between generations, so forging 
new bases for civic identity and action.
5.3 Case study: Connectivity and social 
progress in a Chinese heritage village
The world’s rural population is at its largest ever 
today, even though the world’s urban popula-
tion is (slightly) larger. An understanding of ru-
ral connectivity and its relation to social prog-
ress is therefore indispensable. Located in the 
mountainous interior region of China’s coastal 
Zhejiang Province, Heyang has a population of 
3,670 and more than 1,100 years of history. It is 
a quintessential embodiment of China’s agrarian 
civilization. Its well-preserved Ming-Qing era 
traditional architecture earned it a place in 2013 
in the Chinese State Council’s list of key sites 
of national cultural relics. However, this is also 
a modernized and globalized village: with part 
of its economy integrated into global circuits of 
production and more than half of its labor force 
now working outside the village (most of whom 
only return briefly to reunite with family during 
festival periods).
Village communications also cut across the tra-
ditional and the modern. The oral tradition re-
mains strong: the village’s Senior Center and pop-
ular street corners serve as sites of information 
and gossip exchange. Public announcements are 
posted at centrally located information boards 
and walls at different village corners. However, 
the village’s lineage book, started more than 600 
years ago by a Ming-Dynasty official from the 
village, issued its sixteenth edition in December 
2016 with a grand ceremony. The book contains 
biographies of notable individuals and registers 
the names of all male descendants (female de-
scendants were first recorded in its fifteenth edi-
tion, compiled in 1995).
Wired radio and communal film projection were 
the most popular forms of mediated commu-
nication and entertainment during the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Along with village assemblies, 
these low-tech forms of communication played 
pivotal roles in Mao-era political mobilization 
and cultural integration. Their embeddedness in 
communal life was instrumental to their success 
in linking villagers to the outside world and sus-
taining village cohesion. Starting however from 
the late 1980s, information reception and enter-
tainment have become privatized and personal-
ized. As villagers are exposed to wider and more 
diverse media flows, many feel more isolated 
from each other. Social stratification and income 
polarization, following the dismantling of the 
collective economy, have engendered a further 
sense of social dislocation and community dis-
integration.
The 1990s saw the village’s further leap into the 
digital age: automated direct dial telephone start-
ed in 1990; cable television and analogue mobile 
telephony arrived in 1994 and by 1997, digital 
mobile telephony. Today, Heyang is among the 
150,000 Chinese villages with broadband access 
(in 2015 China’s State Council promised a 98% 
village broadband access rate by 2020). While 
desktop computers are rare, telephones, especial-
ly mobile phones, are widely used, but only the 
young and economically better-off have smart-
phones to connect themselves to the Internet.
In between lies a wide spectrum of communi-
cation patterns and circuits of connectivity that 
have made Heyang a small-scale model of Chi-
na’s highly stratified society. Square dancers in 
the village, for example, have used their smart-
phones to download videos of the latest dancing 
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styles, in this way imagining themselves as part 
of a larger national dance community. A small 
minority, like their urban middle-class counter-
parts, engage in online stock trade. Wechat, the 
most popular Chinese social media platform, 
is popular among village elites, the young and 
the economically well-off. One member of the 
Village Council has more than a dozen Wechat 
friend circles, with relatives, businessmen orig-
inally from the village, government officials, 
and students of Heyang’s culture. However, with 
inclusion also comes exclusion: such Wechat 
friend circles are limited to this member’s own 
professional and interpersonal networks, and so 
exclude the majority of villagers. Moreover, her 
Wechat communications are mostly external-
ly-directed, aiming at promoting Heyang as a 
tourist site, rather than at fellow villagers. Mean-
while, with the higher cost of a digital cable sub-
scription, some poorer villagers have given up on 
cable television service altogether to opt for satel-
lite television, which only requires the one-time 
purchasing cost of a satellite receiving dish. But 
such satellite television services do not include 
local municipal and county television channels. 
Consequently, these households end up with no 
access to local television news.
As a result, many local residents, especially those 
in the lower social strata, complain about their 
lack of communication with village leaders, lack 
of effective participation in village affairs, and a 
general sense of powerlessness in shaping the vil-
lage’s future. Caught in a complex web of local 
governance, land appropriation, village renova-
tion, and tourist development, villagers resort 
to protests and blockages of village construc-
tion projects to communicate their demands 
and frustrations. In one case, in an attempt to 
make their voices heard, some residents refused 
to allow a CCTV crew to film their residential 
courtyard for the 2015 Spring Festival Gala; oth-
ers have tried to derail the village’s lineage book 
compilation project. A few villagers have also ex-
pressed a desire for the return of a village wired 
radio system and Mao-era face-to-face meetings 
of the village community as a whole.
But China’s “great digital leap forward” has not 
created upwardly mobile opportunities for all. X. 
Zhu, a 24-year-old Heyang village youth, grew 
up in a well-off family with postsecondary edu-
cation, but did not live to see a future in Heyang. 
He arranged his own suicide through the Inter-
net in early 2010. Another 24-year-old netizen 
came all the way from Yunan Province in south-
western China to commit suicide together with 
Zhu. Theirs is one of the saddest stories of digital 
connectivity in the Network Age.
5.4 Networked communications among 
East Asian precarious workers
Networked communications offer opportunities 
in many countries for new forms of political and 
social connection, which may be especially im-
portant in spreading public knowledge where 
public broadcasting systems are under threat (see 
Section 4). But this opportunity may occur in the 
context of social conditions, particularly labor 
markets, where ICTs are intensifying the deterio-
ration of working conditions and sustaining new 
structures of precarious labor (SDG 8.8). The re-
sulting balance for social progress may therefore 
be highly ambiguous, and Northeast Asia offers 
an important example of these tensions.
The mobile phone has become deeply entangled 
with the precarious labor culture in Northeast 
Asia. Mobile communication technology has 
intersected with the emergence of increasingly 
insecure working conditions, particularly those 
of young Northeast Asian workers, who are sit-
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uated within the “institutionalized precarious-
ness” of a dual economy made up of a large re-
serve army “with no employment prospects, no 
future, [and] no plans” (Bourdieu 1998: 30f), 
alongside a small privileged minority of secure 
workers with a regular wage. A “mobile precari-
at” (precarious workers who use mobile phones 
to sustain their living within an always-on-call 
working culture)25 suffers from chronically inse-
cure job positions as temporary staff or contract 
workers: they are trapped at the bottom of the 
pay scale, yet at the same time remain connect-
ed through media to the workplace (Qiu 2009). 
This mobile precariat is disadvantaged not only 
through the labor exploitation they endure, but 
also when it comes to seeking remedies for these 
injustices (see Shaviro 2002; Seo and Kim 2009 
for important studies).
Employers’ attitudes vary to mobile phone use 
among their precarious workers. Whereas in Ja-
pan and Taiwan, workers must leave their phones 
behind, beyond their reach, when they start 
work, in South Korea, where the conditions for 
workers are extremely insecure with the second 
longest working hours among OECD countries 
(2,124 hours/year as of 2014),26 mobile phones 
are allowed at work. However, in all countries, 
possessing a mobile phone renders precarious 
workers vulnerable to a wider culture of surveil-
lance. Many employers monitor their workers’ 
lives outside of formal working hours by using 
mobile instant messaging services (KakaoTalk 
in Korea; WeChat in China; Line in Japan and 
Taiwan). Transgressing the normal boundaries 
of work, employers use phones to issue orders 
to their precarious workers on matters such as 
cleanliness, service management, and the em-
ployee code of conduct.
The outcomes are however unstable. In South 
Korea, young precarious workers have attempt-
ed to stir public opinion against unjust business 
practices, by posting images and chat messages 
on social media platforms. They, in turn, have 
been disciplined through remote monitoring on 
live surveillance mobile apps and mobile instant 
messaging. In Japan, there have been on- and 
offline protests against “black companies,” no-
torious for exploiting precarious workers, with 
workers using the Internet and social media to 
disclose their unfair treatment in the workplace 
and share it with others. Given the collapse of the 
public broadcasting system in Japan, online cit-
izen journalism and alternative journalism have 
also offered platforms for building alternative 
understandings of social justice in the workplace 
that go beyond the agendas of mainstream me-
dia.
In summary, Northeast Asia offers a clear exam-
ple of how the mobile phone as an infrastructure 
of connection has become a new technique for 
regulating labor in an always-on-call culture, yet 
continues to offer opportunities for movements 
for social justice and social progress.
25 Also known as Alba [알바] in South Korea, [xin gong ren 新工人] in China, and Freeter [furita フリーター] in Japan.
26 OECD.StatExtract, 2016
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Having in Sections 4 and 5 considered how the 
outputs of media contribute variously to new 
forms of social connection and environments of 
public knowledge – two preconditions for action 
towards social progress – we turn in this section 
to the new social issues raised by the increasing-
ly complex governance structures for media and 
communications outlined in Section 3. We first 
place those issues within the context of a lon-
ger-term struggle for media reform.
6.1 The longer history of democratizing 
media
The expansion of media infrastructures into ever 
wider areas of life through digital platforms has 
generated new types of media activism (Milan 
2016). Across the Global South and the Glob-
al North, today’s media activists fight struggles 
on diverse fronts. However, popular attempts 
to shape media infrastructures into more dem-
ocratic and inclusive social institutions did not 
begin with the media activists of the twenty-first 
century.
Just as media infrastructures have developed dif-
ferently in each nation and region of the world 
(see Section 2), so efforts to reshape and reform 
the media are varied. Before the consolidation 
of the advertising-supported commercial press, 
radical working class publications in the United 
Kingdom, United States and Canada emerged 
to challenge the dominant press order (Hack-
ett and Zhao 1998). With the rise of electron-
ic communication, U.S. media activists in the 
1920s and 1930s demanded public ownership 
of the telegraph and noncommercial radio (Mc-
Chesney 1993; Stein 2009). In Russia and Chi-
na, communist and nationalist revolutionaries 
established alternative media systems as part of 
their attempts to seek social progress through 
anticapitalistic and nationalistic struggles; the 
resulting media structures, however, degenerat-
ed into ossified state-controlled systems. Never-
theless, antiestablishment communication forms 
(underground tabloids and samizdat in Russia; 
the big-character posters on China’s Democracy 
Wall) testified to the radical democratic commu-
nication impulse of these postrevolutionary so-
cieties.
In the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights movements 
in the United States and Canada responded to 
poor media coverage of their struggles for social 
justice by demanding more access to the main-
stream media, and developing their own media 
(Stein 2009). The battle around cable television 
regulation in these countries was one of the most 
salient victories of media reform movements, 
as cable companies are now mandated to estab-
lish community and educational channels free 
of charge (Halleck 2001) (SPI “Access to basic 
knowledge”). In Latin America, in response to 
the brutal dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, 
grassroots groups developed their own under-
ground communication networks in a long bat-
tle to pressure states to democratize the media 
(Rodríguez and Murphy 1997). Meanwhile, in 
several European countries, pirate radio was the 
precursor of later struggles for media regulation 
that guarantees space for public and community 
media (Jankowski, Prehn, and Stappers 1992).
In 1976, in one of the earliest global efforts to de-
mocratize the media, Amadou Mathar M’Bow, 
Director of UNESCO, appointed a commission 
of sixteen experts to examine global commu-
nication problems. The commission’s final re-
port, known as the MacBride Report, described 
6. Struggles for social justice through the democratization of media
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shocking information inequalities between First 
and Third World countries (UNESCO 1980). The 
report documented high levels of media concen-
tration in a few transnational media corporations 
mostly located in rich, industrialized countries. 
Such concentration had many damaging conse-
quences including highly unequal information 
flows between rich and poor countries; a lack of 
diversity among the voices and sources of infor-
mation and communication; and a flow of media 
content from the North to the South that threat-
ened the latter’s local cultures. The MacBride Re-
port argued that a New World Information and 
Communication Order was urgently necessary.
Efforts towards a NWICO, including recom-
mendations for national communication poli-
cies, reduced media concentration, more South-
to-South communication channels, and a mass 
media code of ethics, embroiled UNESCO in a 
high-profile dispute with the United States, who 
interpreted the report’s recommendations as a 
threat to “freedom of the press,” defined with-
in the liberal framework as freedom from gov-
ernment control. In 2003, the Communication 
Rights for the Information Society Campaign 
(CRIS) emerged as a new moment of global 
media reform. The CRIS Campaign, which still 
continues, encompasses four pillars of communi-
cation rights: the right to participate in the pub-
lic sphere; the right to knowledge; civil rights in 
communication; and cultural rights in commu-
nication (Siochrú 2005).
The first two decades of the twenty-first century 
have been marked by UNESCO’s efforts to protect 
journalists and defend freedom of expression. 
The UN Human Rights Council’s “Resolution on 
the Safety of Journalists” (2016) is welcome, but 
does not yet extend to Russia and China. In 2015, 
Member States endorsed the concept of “Internet 
Universality” which includes four principles for 
Internet governance: human rights, openness, 
accessibility and multistakeholder participation 
(UNESCO 2015).
Looking back over the past four decades, inter-
national governmental organizations and me-
dia activists have broadened their platforms and 
struggles to include communications as an im-
portant dimension of social progress. As Laura 
Stein notes: “communication policy activism 
spans the gamut from representational concerns 
with the end products of communication to the 
deep-seated political, economic, regulatory, and 
infrastructural issues that shape the larger cul-
tural environment” (Stein 2009: 2- 3). At stake 
in this continued battle is a foundational change 
in the governance of media and communications 
infrastructures no less profound than that called 
for urban governance in Chapter 5. We turn for 
the rest of this section to specific struggles that 
target the underlying communications infra-
structure of the digital age and its increasingly 
complex needs for governance.
6.2 Transparency and accountability of 
media infrastructures and mediated data 
flows
The last decade has seen the emergence of in-
creasing global concern about the transparency 
and accountability of media infrastructures and 
the data flows that they carry (SDG 9; SPI “Access 
to information and communications”). In some 
cases, those concerns have prompted popular 
protests and engendered new forms and sites of 
resistance. One important category of concern 
about transparency and accountability relates to 
the conditions of access to information online. 
Populations worldwide have begun to pay atten-
tion to the effects of private agreements for pref-
erential treatment that, behind the scenes, struc-
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ture the universe of information they see (IPSP 
2017).
Initially, struggles over preferential treatment 
took the form of efforts to secure formal enact-
ment of the principle of “network neutrality”. 
Proponents of network neutrality argued that In-
ternet access providers should treat all content, 
sites, and services equally without 73
discriminating among different sources, ser-
vices, or providers, while Internet access pro-
viders sought greater leeway to experiment with 
differential quality of service. For the most part, 
countries around the world have resolved this 
debate in favor of network neutrality, although 
European regulations create a preferential ex-
emption for certain specialized, high-bandwidth 
services.27 Since there is no reason to believe that 
unregulated markets by themselves will preserve 
anything like network neutrality, this issue is 
likely to remain important for media’s positive 
contribution to public knowledge.
Formal regulatory adoption of network neutral-
ity mandates, however, has not resolved disputes 
about preferential access, but has simply shifted 
the terrain. Worldwide, regulatory implementa-
tion of network nondiscrimination mandates has 
often been followed by so-called “zero-rating” 
initiatives. Zero-rating refers to an arrangement 
by which an Internet access provider or mobile 
services provider agrees to exempt a particular 
content service from the data caps otherwise 
imposed on its users. Such agreements may be 
made in return for flat payments or in return for 
access to data about the behavior of users as they 
use the zero-rated service. Zero-rating agree-
ments tend to drive traffic toward exempted data 
services, to the advantage of those providing 
them, so indirectly challenging the net neutrality 
principle.
A second important category of transparency 
and accountability issues relates to targeted re-
moval of online information. Such removal may 
be mandated or initiated by an information in-
termediary (for example, a platform company). 
It may also involve the threatened (or feared) as-
sertion of intellectual property rights, a request 
for removal or de-indexing in connection with 
rights afforded under data protection regula-
tion, enforcement of privately-defined accept-
able-content policies, or direct state censorship. 
Because the failure to remove some types of in-
formation can itself raise justice issues, targeted 
removal may sometimes be appropriate. Very of-
ten, however, such content filtering mechanisms 
remain secretive and unaccountable. Concerns 
about secret and unaccountable content filtering 
have sparked protests around the world, result-
ing in a new model of activism that takes digi-
tal media simultaneously as a site and target of 
protest activity. Such activity has achieved polit-
ical gains, but arguably also accelerated the shift 
toward corporatized governance (described in 
Section 3.2).
In the United States, a protest movement that 
originated domestically and then spread global-
ly defeated proposed legislation tried to impose 
content filtering obligations on domain name reg-
istrars and payment providers (Herman 2013). 
Subsequently, however, major U.S. payment pro-
viders have acceded to a set of voluntary “best 
27 For the U.S. regulation, see “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,” 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737 (Apr. 13, 2015). For the 
European Union regulation, see Regulation 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2015 laying down measures concerning open Internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service 
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on 
roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union, L 301/1.
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practices” that involves them more actively in 
private intellectual property enforcement (Bridy 
2015). In Australia, a popular protest movement 
opposed a government proposal that would have 
required Internet service providers to perform 
mandatory content filtering; the government 
eventually withdrew the proposal after politi-
cal opposition proved firm, and after the major 
Australian ISPs voluntarily agreed to block 1,400 
sites previously identified as child pornography 
purveyors.28 In China, where state involvement 
in filtering and suppression of dissident or other-
wise disfavored expression is more direct, protest 
movements have taken correspondingly more 
indirect forms that involve the use of seemingly 
innocuous code words to discuss forbidden top-
ics (Link and Xiao 2013).
Anticensorship and “Internet freedom” activists 
have developed new, crowd-sourced methods of 
discovering and documenting content remov-
al efforts and actions, producing web sites such 
as chillingeffects.org, a U.S.-based site that cat-
alogues copyright takedown notices, and on-
linecensorship.org, a project by the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation that catalogues content re-
movals by social media sites. Some global plat-
form companies, such as Twitter and Google, 
have begun to disseminate information about 
various types of targeted removals (e.g., Google’s 
“transparency report”), although they have been 
much less forthcoming about their own accept-
able-content protocols.
A final set of concerns about transparency and ac-
countability relates to processes of automated, al-
gorithmically-processed mediation and filtering. 
Many dominant market providers – Google and 
Baidu in search, Facebook in social networking, 
Twitter in microblogging – use predictive algo-
rithms to structure the universe of information 
that users see, and network neutrality mandates 
do not address those practices. Such algorithms 
operate invisibly to create displays to users that 
are tailored to what is known or inferred about 
that user. To individual users, however, the dis-
plays may appear universal and neutral. As we 
noted in Section 3.3, there are important, unre-
solved issues concerning the accountability of 
such automated filtering.
6.3 New concentrations of power via media 
infrastructures and mediated data flows
The new concentrations of power exerted via 
media infrastructures and mediated data flows 
have themselves generated rising levels of con-
cern, prompting activism by civil society groups 
and sometimes more widespread protests and 
struggles (SDG 9).
One important cluster of issues involves propri-
etary claims to information networks and re-
sources. Even as digital media activists and civil 
society groups have pushed for greater legal free-
dom to store, share, and modify content online, 
law enforcement authorities around the world 
have pushed to make outlaws of individuals and 
businesses who facilitate file-sharing. Enforce-
ment has proceeded both via highly-publicized 
litigation and by off-the-record efforts to seize or 
block access to Internet domains (McCourt and 
Burkart 2003; Palmer and Warren 2013; see also 
28 A. Ramadge, “Get Up! Organizes Advertising Blitz to Protest Internet Filter,” 4 Dec. 2008, http://web.archive.org/
web/20090215191458/ http://www.news.com.au:80/story/0,,24750766-2,00.html; R.N. Charette, “Australian Govern-
ment Gives Up on Filtering the Internet,” IEEE Spectrum, 12 Nov. 2012, http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/comput-
ing/it/australian-government-gives-up-on-filtering-the-Internet.
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Bridy 2015). In addition, as discussed in Section 
3.2, both nation states and powerful corporate 
actors have sought enhanced intellectual prop-
erty protection through trade agreements. In 
Europe, popular opposition to the prospect of 
stepped-up intellectual property enforcement 
defeated ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, which had been negotiated 
with the United States, Japan, and other coun-
tries. However, many provisions for enhanced 
enforcement have appeared in a different agree-
ment, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (which was 
signed in 2016 but has not entered into force) 
(Public Citizen 2015b). Less is known about an-
other agreement, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, now under negotiation 
between the United States and Europe.
Another set of issues relating to power exerted 
through today’s fast-changing media infrastruc-
tures involves the surveillance conducted by pow-
erful third parties, such as nation-states (IPSP 
2017). In the wake of the revelations by Edward 
Snowden about the extent of the U.S. National 
Security Administration’s surveillance of glob-
al electronic communications, both ordinary 
citizens and governments worldwide protested 
NSA’s lawless and seemingly unconstrained be-
havior. The Snowden revelations, however, also 
showed that national security services in multi-
ple jurisdictions – including some of those now 
protesting most loudly – cooperated with the 
NSA and with each other, helping to form a net-
work for evading existing domestic procedures 
for oversight (Privacy International 2013).29
Resistance to those efforts has taken varied 
forms. Some experts in computer security have 
formed ventures to develop and market secure 
“black phones” and online tools, while others 
have helped activists and civil society groups to 
explore, understand, and expose the full range 
of lawful and unlawful government surveillance 
activity.30 As described in Section 3, some large 
information companies also have actively resist-
ed the expansion of government surveillance. 
One country, Iceland, has resolved to develop 
comprehensive legislation establishing itself as a 
safe harbor for whistleblowers and investigative 
journalists.31
Civil society organizations and, more recently, 
frustrated legislators, have put sustained pressure 
on trade negotiators to make treaty processes 
more transparent and democratically account-
able.32 New political movements and parties have 
formed around platforms for access to informa-
tion and free culture (Beyer 2014), and the free/
libre/open source software (FLOSS) movement 
has worked to foster the development and adop-
tion of open systems that may be freely used and 
adapted (Coleman 2013; Gamalielsson and Lun-
29 E. MacAskill and J. Ball, “Portrait of the NSA: No Detail Too Small in Quest for Total Surveillance,” The Guardian, 2 
Nov. 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/02/nsa-portrait-total-surveillance.
30 B. Schneier, K. Seidel, and Saranja Vijayakumar, “Worldwide Encryption Products Survey,” Version 1.0, Feb. 11, 2016. 
Available: Schneier on Security, https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/worldwide-survey-of-encryption-prod-
ucts.pdf; S. Laskow, “Is Communications Security for Reporters Improving?,” Columbia Journalism Review, Aug. 11, 
2014, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/is_communications_security_for.php; A. Rinehart, “Encryption Becomes a 
Part of Journalists’ Toolkit,” HuffPost Media, Apr. 10, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-groundtruth-project/
encryption-becomes-a-part_b_7041278.html.
31 International Modern Media Institute, “IMMI Resolution,” https://en.immi.is/immi-resolution/.
32 Perhaps as a result, some provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s intellectual property chapter are less draconian 
than they had been in earlier, leaked versions of the proposed text. See K. Cox, “Analysis of the Final TPP (Leaked) Text 
on Intellectual Property: Mixed Results,” InfoJustice.org, 15 Oct. 2015, http://infojustice.org/archives/35159.
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dell 2014).
A third cluster of struggles involves efforts by 
privacy activists and researchers to mobilize civil 
society groups and the public against commer-
cial information power. This struggle needs to be 
understood within a wider diagnosis of contem-
porary media infrastructures’ central role in the 
emergence of a new form of surveillance capital-
ism, whereby populations worldwide comprise a 
source of raw materials for new practices of sur-
plus extraction (Cohen 2015; Zuboff 2015).
Disputes over these questions are as widely var-
ied as the contexts and population groups in-
volved. In the United States and Europe, com-
mercial surveillance practices have engendered 
legal struggles over behavioral credit monitor-
ing, drawing attention to the role of predictive 
profiling in the high-risk lending practices that 
contributed to the global financial crisis of 2008 
(Pasquale 2015). Meanwhile, in an effort to en-
list users themselves in both frustrating and ex-
posing the practices of surveillance capitalism, 
teams of researchers have worked to design new 
privacy tools, such as ad blockers and tracker 
visualization tools (Eaglehardt and Narayanan 
2016; Kennedy 2016).
In the Global South, struggles over the spread of 
surveillance capitalism have involved challenges 
to public-private partnerships for the delivery of 
services. In India, debates concerning the possi-
ble uses of a new national identification number 
have proved sharply divisive. In 2015, the Indian 
government launched the Digital India Initiative, 
which is based on the use of the Aadhar Unique 
Identity (UID) scheme for biometric authentica-
tion of recipients of government benefits and ser-
vices. The Aadhar scheme, which is the world’s 
largest biometrics-based database initiative, was 
developed by corporate technology partners, and 
critics charge that too little is known about its ca-
pabilities and potential future uses (see also the 
India case study in Section 6.4).33 In Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, questions have been raised about the 
undisclosed uses of data collected via privately 
funded mobile telephony and banking initiatives 
(Hosein and Nyst 2013; Taylor 2015, 2016a).
More generally, in the international development 
context, attention to data protection questions 
has highlighted how routine practices of data 
collection and sharing can put local populations 
at risk (Taylor 2016b) (SPI “Private rights”). 
There is a deep, if rarely noticed, continuity 
between these recent debates about control of 
networked information flows and the struggles 
of indigenous peoples against broadcasters for 
many decades. For example, Australia’s Aborig-
inal communities have developed protocols that 
regulate how media makers – both individu-
al media producers and media industries – can 
proceed on Aboriginal lands and among Aborig-
inal communities (Janke 1999; West 2014). Any 
individual producer or media industry intending 
to operate among Aboriginal communities must 
gain clearances from Aboriginal custodians be-
33 Manan Kakkar, “Companies, Processes and Technology behind India’s UID Project, Aadhaar,” Oct. 1, 2010, http://
www.zdnet.com/article/companies-processes-and-technology-behind-indias-uid-project-aadhaar/; Shweta Punj, 
“A Number of Changes,” Business Today, Mar. 4, 2012, http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/uid-project-nan-
dan-nilekani-future-unique-identification/1/22288.html; Silvia Masiero, “UID/Aadhar and the PDS: What New 
Technologies Mean for India’s Food Security System”, India at LSE, May 5, 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/indiaat-
lse/2014/05/12/uidaadhar-and-the-pds-what-new-technologies-mean-for-indias-food-security-system/; Jean Dreze, 
“Unique Identity Dilemma,” The Indian Express, Mar. 19, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/
unique-identity-dilemma/. See section 6.3.
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fore capturing, disseminating, reproducing, or 
archiving data about the land or the people. By 
defining a framework of respect, integrity, au-
thenticity, and consultation with Aboriginal au-
thorities and custodians, Aboriginal protocols 
have sought to ensure media accountability. Far 
from seeing such protocols as part of a “local 
culture” that unhelpfully resists “progress” (com-
pare IPSP Chapter 15), we need to look to them 
as precursors of the fundamental changes need-
ed in the governance of data flows. But no such 
protocols have yet been developed to govern data 
flows in the wider development context.
6.4 Case Study: Civil Society Activism in 
India: Facebook Free Basics34
Recent events in India offer an example of the 
ability of civil society activism to challenge the 
power of global digital platforms. We will focus 
here particularly on Facebook’s proposed intro-
duction of its “Free Basics” platform for Internet 
access, but will situate the struggle over Free Ba-
sics in the broader context of other disputes over 
information rights in India in recent years.
Facebook’s Free Basics platform is a joint pri-
vate-public partnership ostensibly committed 
to expanding Internet access for first-time users 
of the Internet in select countries in Asia, Lat-
in America, and Africa. Facebook’s CEO, Mark 
Zuckerberg, launched the initiative in 2013 
(originally branded as Internet.org) in partner-
ship with Samsung, Ericsson, MediaTek, Opera 
Software, Nokia, and Qualcomm. It was based 
on an “app” that enables smartphone users lim-
ited, free access to certain sites and services on 
the Internet, and that is designed to function on 
less robust 2G networks, potentially encourag-
ing users to subscribe to mobile access packages 
(Hemple 2016).
From the Indian government’s perspective, Free 
Basics represented an opportunity to expand its 
digital footprint into the daily lives of Indian cit-
izens, by integrating Free Basics within its flag-
ship Digital India initiative (discussed in Section 
6.2). The Indian PM Narendra Modi’s attempts 
to use social media including Twitter, Facebook, 
Youtube, Instagram, and other platforms for po-
litical purposes are well known (Pal, Chandra 
and Vydiswaran 2016). In September 2015, he 
met Mark Zuckerberg in Silicon Valley, Califor-
nia (Mukherjee 2015). For Facebook, signing 
India to Free Basics would have given Facebook 
unrivalled access to the members of its second 
largest market (125 million users). The deal was 
celebrated on Facebook with both Modi’s and 
Zuckerberg’s profile pictures wrapped in the 
green, orange, and white of the Indian flag, lead-
ing millions of users to update their profiles with 
the tri-color.
Civil society activists however viewed Free Ba-
sics as an attempt by a commercial vendor to 
tether users to its product and monopolize the 
terms of access to the wider Internet, so com-
promising the tenets of network neutrality (dis-
cussed in Section 6.2). While civil society groups 
in India had previously advocated specific re-
forms such as banning software patents and sup-
port for free and open source software (FOSS), 
a new “Save The Internet” campaign mobilized 
millions of users to petition the Telecom Regu-
latory Authority of India (TRAI) to uphold the 
broad principle of network neutrality. Facebook 
was completely caught off guard by the extent of 
the mobilization of Indian civil society in India 
against Free Basics.
34 Case study written by Pradip Thomas.
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In February 2016, the TRAI acted to uphold the 
principle of network neutrality. TRAI’s regula-
tion, titled “Prohibition of Discriminatory Tariffs 
for Data Services Regulation” provides that “no 
service provider shall offer or charge discrim-
inatory tariffs for data services on the basis of 
content”. TRAI’s response was surprising given 
its previous support for industry interests over 
those of civil society (Abraham 2016). Addition-
ally, while trade bodies such as the Cellular Op-
erators Association of India (COAI) supported 
“differential pricing,” others such as the National 
Association for Software and Services Compa-
nies (NASSCOM) opposed it.
This episode, which illustrates both the poten-
tial for cozy, mutually beneficial relationships 
between global platform companies and na-
tion-state governments and the ability of civil 
society to challenge such relationships, needs to 
be put in the broader context of grassroots strug-
gle for information rights in India in recent years 
(SPI “Access to information and communica-
tions”). Campaigns spearheaded by individuals 
such as Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey and organi-
zations such as the National Campaign for Peo-
ple’s Right to Information led to the Indian gov-
ernment enacting the Right to Information Act 
in 2005. Such campaigns, along with a variety of 
social movements for information rights, created 
a broader recognition of the need for knowledge 
of entitlements and rights, facilitated access to 
information, and transparency and accountabili-
ty in the disbursement of public funds.
This broad Right to Information movement laid 
the foundations for the subsequent struggles not 
only against Facebook’s Free Basics initiative but 
also against the Aadhar Unique Identity (UID) 
scheme (discussed in Section 6.2). A number of 
the organizations that contested Free Basics also 
contest the Aadhar initiative. They have consis-
tently highlighted shortfalls in the collection of 
biometric data, the security and authentication 
issues that surround a centralized database on 
citizens, the potential for misuse of private in-
formation and for mass surveillance of citizens, 
and the absence of privacy laws. While the gov-
ernment has defended the scheme as a means to 
combat benefit fraud and protect national secu-
rity, critics highlighted successfully the threat to 
basic freedoms from this expansion of the digital 
infrastructure.
6.5 Normative implications of media infra-
structures and mediated data flows
The developments discussed in this section 
raise three broad sets of normative implications: 
for autonomy, economic justice, and political 
self-determination.
First and most basically, new and unaccount-
able concentrations of power exerted via media 
infrastructures and mediated data flows have 
implications for individual autonomy. As media 
infrastructures become more pervasive in every-
day life, they increasingly mediate the human ex-
perience of the self, the other, and the world. As 
they connect individuals and communities, they 
also structure the universe of information and 
personalize informational exposure. The dynam-
ics of continual, feedback-driven personalization 
invest information intermediaries with enor-
mous power over processes of individual self-de-
termination, which in a less intensively mediated 
world have been much more open-textured and 
amenable to serendipity (Cohen 2012). Since in-
dividual autonomy is a necessary element of any 
form of social progress, it is essential to consider 
the implications of such large-scale media-based 
developments for the ongoing goal of social 
progress.
49
Second, as described in Section 3.3, the emer-
gence of new economic models based on sur-
veillance, social sorting, and predictive profiling 
has implications for economic justice (SDG 9). 
The necessary frameworks for protective regu-
lation against such forms of data extraction are 
incompletely developed and unevenly imple-
mented. Moreover, as privacy activists and civil 
society organizations worldwide have worked 
to raise public awareness of surveillance and its 
threats to privacy, they have struggled against an 
antiregulatory discourse that aims to defeat pro-
tective regulation by linking surveillance tightly 
with a generalized innovation imperative (Co-
hen 2016).
Finally, commercial and government practic-
es of surveillance, social sorting, and predictive 
profiling have profound implications for politi-
cal self-determination. The basic possibilities for 
political self-determination are important not 
just for political processes themselves, but also 
for wider processes of human development, rich-
ly understood (Sen 1999). Yet there is mounting 
evidence that predictive algorithms can be used 
to alter user behavior, in ways that implicate val-
ues of democratic self-governance and the rule 
of law. Facebook has publicly acknowledged con-
ducting experiments on how personalization of 
the content in newsfeeds can affect users’ moods 
and other experiments reminding users to go to 
the polls and vote (Grimmelmann 2015). There 
is no guarantee that future experiments would 
be disclosed, nor is Facebook subject to ethical 
guidelines similar to those that constrain hu-
man-subject experimentation in other contexts. 
Google’s chief economist similarly has charac-
terized Google’s user base as subjects for experi-
mentation (Varian 2014).
The prospect that large information intermedi-
aries may enjoy wholly unaccountable power to 
manipulate the flows of social and public knowl-
edge is alarming. More generally, the continu-
ous, immanent, and highly granular regulatory 
processes by which such privately controlled in-
termediaries exert power via media infrastruc-
tures (and the new discourse of human devel-
opment through the exploitation of “big data” 
which helps legitimate such power) exist in ten-
sion with broadly shared commitments to due 
process and the rule of law (Hildebrandt 2015).
We end this section with an important case 
where the broad social justice issues raised by 
the governance of media and communications 
infrastructures entered the political domain: the 
civil-society based NETmundial initiative which 
emerged in Brazil in the wake of the Snowden 
revelations.
6.6 Case study: Brazil’s Marco Civil on 
Internet governance
After the Snowden scandal of 2013 revealed 
mass electronic surveillance and espionage by 
U.S. intelligence agencies, diverse global ini-
tiatives to defend the freedom of the Internet 
emerged from civil society. At the time of writ-
ing, the most progressive regulatory framework 
for the Internet is Marco Civil da Internet (Civil 
Rights Framework for the Internet), an initiative 
developed jointly by Brazil’s civil society and the 
former government of Dilma Rousseff. Unlike 
authoritarian states who show greater concern 
over the implications of the Internet for regime 
stability than for freedom, and unlike liberal de-
mocracies in North America and Europe – who 
fear increased state control and often defer to 
private, corporatized governance of media infra-
structures – Brazil supports universal free Inter-
net, while being also critical of the international 
governance structures that guide it (Trinkunas 
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and Wallace 2015: 2). The Marco Civil is an ex-
emplar of alternative ways of thinking about In-
ternet governance and its relation to wider social 
justice, without claiming that, by itself, a regu-
latory framework can create a different type of 
Internet infrastructure, let alone address all the 
issues of power to which any communications 
infrastructure gives rise.
The Marco Civil sought to rethink what freedom 
and citizenship mean when it comes to the Inter-
net. Adopted on April 23, 2014, the Civil Rights 
Framework is intended as a prototype for Inter-
net regulation globally. The Marco Civil emerged 
from NETmundial, a conference convened by 
Brazil’s national Internet steering committee 
and organized as a multistakeholder dialogue 
between government, industry, and civil society. 
The framework that became the Marco Civil was 
developed through a series of online and offline 
deliberations that invited Brazilian citizens to 
shape a legal framework for Internet regulation. 
It is significant not only as an initiative born from 
civil society in dialogue with government and 
private sectors, but also as a proposal emerging 
from the Global South, framed by social move-
ments committed to the idea of communication 
rights. The Marco Civil has the potential to act as 
a balance to the global power of the United States 
on Internet governance issues.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the In-
ternet advances the commitment to respect for 
civil rights as an important component of Inter-
net regulation and governance. Recognizing the 
vulnerability of users, the Marco Civil emphasiz-
es the Internet’s social goals, protects the rights 
of Internet users, and proposes the adoption of 
open source technologies that allow free access 
to information, knowledge, and culture. In the 
eyes of civil society activists (Gutiérrez 2014), the 
most important achievements of Brazil’s Marco 
Civil include protection of freedom and privacy, 
open governance, universal inclusion, cultural 
diversity, and network neutrality.
The Marco Civil considers access to the Inter-
net fundamental to democracy, as it is essential 
for participation in political life and cultural 
production, and part of the right to education 
and freedom of expression. It therefore advo-
cates reducing inequalities in access to digital 
technologies and promotes the development of 
competencies to use digital platforms effectively. 
It proposes universal Internet service with con-
trolled rates and sufficient connection speed and 
also promotes education on the rights of con-
sumers, ethical consumerism, and protection 
against misleading advertising and deceptive 
business methods (Compare SPI “Access to basic 
knowledge”).
The Marco Civil stipulates that, while Internet 
providers are free to compete, they are also re-
sponsible for guaranteeing freedom of speech, 
freedom of access to information, net neutrality, 
and protection of privacy. The Marco Civil for-
bids any type of discrimination based on disabil-
ity, sexual orientation, or political or religious 
affiliations. It also provides for the protection of 
users’ data and reputation and the right to the 
free development of personality,35 and guaran-
tees the right to access information and the right 
to rectification (SPI “Access to information and 
communications”). The Marco Civil states that 
citizens should be encouraged to move from be-
ing mere consumers of information, knowledge, 
and culture to becoming content creators. The 
35 Compare the similar ‘right to free development of [the] personality’ recognized in German law: Article 2 of the Grund-
gesetz.
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framework calls for the development of appro-
priate digital tools to facilitate the creation of 
information, knowledge, and culture by citizens, 
and states that the Internet should promote the 
production and circulation of such local content. 
Not surprisingly therefore movements that de-
fend the freedom of knowledge strongly support 
this new code, to which Brazil’s free software 
community was a principal contributor (Gutiér-
rez 2014). As initially proposed, the Marco Civil 
also mandated that all information and content 
about Brazil should be archived in Brazil, but 
that restriction was removed following lobby-
ing by transnational Internet corporations. Ul-
timately, the Marco Civil provided that all Bra-
zilian Internet content or content about Brazil is 
considered “Brazilian” and can be the object of 
observation. The Marco Civil eliminates criminal 
copyright penalties for content usage by citizens. 
It however recognizes civil copyright laws that 
limit access to digital content and hinder collab-
orative creation, in tension with the goal of an 
entirely free digital culture.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the In-
ternet mandates network neutrality (discussed 
in Section 6.2), and prohibits discriminatory ac-
tion against any type of content or user, either by 
changing the speed of transmission or restrict-
ing content. Network neutrality ensures that all 
data travels at the same speed and without any 
restrictions based on the nature of the content or 
the nature of the user. Brazil’s Marco Civil forbids 
blocking, monitoring, filtering, or analyzing con-
tent for commercial, political, moral, religious, 
or ideological reasons. The principle of network 
neutrality is here affirmed as essential to a collab-
orative and democratic digital culture.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework propos-
es a model of governance through multistake-
holder, transparent, collaborative, and demo-
cratic mechanisms. The creators of the Marco 
Civil hoped to inspire activists and civil society 
organizations in other countries to demand sim-
ilar laws (Gutierrez 2014), proposing “a global 
Internet that promotes freedom, inclusion, and 
diversity” (Trinkunas and Wallace 2015: 37). The 
code’s provisions were in many cases opposed 
by global platform companies and sometimes 
defeated. It remains too early to determine the 
long-term influence of the model proposed, 
but its significance as an alternative to standard 
models of governance remains.
7. Struggles for social justice through media
We come in this final main section of the chapter 
to consider the distinctive role that media and 
communications play in struggles for social jus-
tice and those struggles’ overall contribution to 
social progress. The transformation of media in-
frastructures in the final decades of the twentieth 
century gave rise to new communication ecolo-
gies, which enabled divergent worldviews and 
political interests to draw on a multitude of me-
dia resources in their struggles for social justice.
7.1 Appropriating the Digital
Individuals and communities around the world 
have learned to appropriate media, especial-
ly digital communications infrastructures. The 
most notable late twentieth century case of ap-
propriating media for social justice was provided 
by the Zapatistas in Mexico.
In 1994, just as Mexico was preparing to sign 
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the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) with the United States and Canada, 
the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
(EZLN) (Zapatista Army of National Liberation), 
an indigenous guerrilla organization, abrupt-
ly came to national attention by seizing towns 
in the region of Chiapas and demanding land, 
work, food, housing, education, independence, 
freedom, justice, and peace for Mexico’s indig-
enous communities. The Mexican government 
attempted to annihilate the EZLN before news 
of the group reached the global public sphere 
but did not succeed. The EZLN’s resistance has 
been analyzed from many perspectives, but in 
this chapter its importance lies not in its general 
repertoire of activism, but more as an exemplar 
of how, in the late twentieth century, media and 
culture came to be appropriated in new ways by 
social justice movements.
Using diverse media technologies and strate-
gies, the Zapatistas activated a communication 
network that linked Mexican indigenous com-
munities with social justice activists worldwide. 
In terms of media technology, Zapatista videos 
recorded on VHS tapes were carried out of the 
Lacandon jungle to the nearest urban centers 
and then on to Mexico City, where U.S. activists 
picked them up and took them to Austin, Tex-
as to be digitized and uploaded on computer 
listservs; meanwhile Zapatista audio recordings 
and texts were translated into multiple languag-
es and disseminated via then-emerging digital 
platforms. In terms of cultural message, Sub-
comandante Marcos, the main spokesperson of 
the Zapatistas at the time, used these practical 
means to issue statements that framed the local 
struggles of marginalized Mexican indigenous 
communities as aligned with other social justice 
and identity struggles in the Global North and 
Global South (Rodríguez, Kidd and Stein 2010), 
proposing himself as standing in for “every un-
tolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is 
. . . now beginning to speak” (Subcomandante 
Marcos 1994).
Through their distinctive use of communications 
(both technological and cultural) the Zapatistas 
served to link social justice collectives and indi-
viduals worldwide into a wave of international 
solidarity in the global public sphere, alerting 
the Mexican government and its army that the 
whole world was monitoring human rights abus-
es against indigenous communities in southern 
Mexico (Pianta and Marchetti 2007). Social jus-
tice activists in many countries worldwide came 
to adopt Zapatista language, goals, and commu-
nication strategies. “Zapatismo” came for many 
to represent a new type of social justice activ-
ism, based less on formal institutional structures 
and more on “participation and deliberation, 
collective autonomy, and decentralized power 
structures” (Ferron 2012: 157). Marcos’ specific 
manifesto for the “construction of a world where 
many worlds fit” (EZLN 1996) became exempla-
ry for linking social justice to questions of cul-
ture (voice and diversity in public spheres) and 
questions of media (the need for inclusive media 
infrastructures).
The influence of this exemplar was shown in De-
cember 1999 by the actions of a wide coalition of 
protesters who met in Seattle to disrupt a World 
Trade Organization (WTO) summit. Because 
the Seattle protests originated a series of demon-
strations against the dominant model of neolib-
eral globalization, the movement is sometimes 
labelled the “anti-globalization movement,” but 
they refused that label, as they were not op-
posed to globalization, but to specific economic 
models that spread inequity worldwide. Learn-
ing from the EZLN, this movement insisted on 
producing their own media rather than allowing 
mainstream media to shape the narrative about 
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their actions. The Seattle protest organizers set 
up the first Independent Media Center (Indyme-
dia), and enabled protesters to produce and edit 
their own coverage of the protests by uploading 
to Indymedia’s web page which, in turn, incor-
porated Open Publishing software made avail-
able by media activist Matthew Arnison from 
Sydney’s Community Activist Technology group 
(Arnison 2001; Kidd 2004). This model was rep-
licated during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century in hundreds of cities worldwide under 
the motto “Don’t hate the media, be the media”.
Even in a world of corporate-owned digital plat-
forms, these visions from the Lacandon jungle 
and Seattle still resonate through alternative 
models of how social justice activists can appro-
priate and redesign media technologies to meet 
their distinctive information and communica-
tion needs (Rodríguez 2001; in press).
7.2 Affordances and constraints: From the 
mobile phone to social media and beyond
If the circumstances of the Zapatistas’ innova-
tions were exceptional, broader changes in ac-
cess to media technologies have been important 
too. With the introduction of prepaid accounts, 
low-cost handsets and relatively easy connec-
tivity, mobile phone usage has spread across all 
social groups, including poor and marginalized 
populations. Despite stark inequalities in ac-
cess, use, literacy, and resources (Donner 2015; 
Qiu 2014), much social innovation and activism 
with mobile phones has emerged, enabling col-
lective action of all sorts, whether progressive or 
not. At the same time, the migration of activism 
to new digital platforms has encountered new 
constraints. We must always remember that the 
very same communication resources that benefit 
movements for social justice and social progress 
are also benefiting the movements that oppose 
them, including forces of right-wing extremism 
and authoritarian populism. Before discussing 
activism in more detail, it is important to note 
also that the affordances of mobile technologies 
and social networking platforms enable new 
kinds of everyday solidarity in contexts outside 
of politics. The use of mobile phones, Internet, 
and social media has been important among 
migrants and their dispersed family, cultural, 
and political networks (Fortunati, Pertierra, and 
Vincent 2012). Filipino workers and other do-
mestic workers (generally women) who spend 
years away from their families and communities 
use mobile phones and social media to maintain 
bonds and connection with friends and families 
(Madianou and Miller 2012). Chinese migrants 
who leave rural areas to find work in cities (Chu 
et al. 2012) also rely on mobile phones to create 
a new “modern” identity, spanning urban and 
rural settings (Wallis 2013). Outside the con-
text of migration, diverse communities use mo-
bile phones to redraw the boundaries between 
the private and personal and create “intimate 
publics” (Hjorth, King, and Kataoka 2014), for 
example to mourn or grieve (Cann 2014; Cum-
insky and Hjorth 2016). In the wake of the earth-
quake and tsunami disaster of March 11, 2011 
social media and mobile phones provided new 
channels for citizens to witness solidarity and 
contribute to disaster responses in Japan (Hjorth 
and Kim 2011).
One of the earliest places where uses of social 
media and mobile phones entered politics was 
Africa, where mobiles have been used for shar-
ing information on health (SDG 3), “witnessing” 
human rights violations (through the incorpora-
tion of cameras into mobile phones), and citizen 
journalism, including election monitoring (Ek-
ine 2010). An instructive case is Ushahidi (mean-
ing “testimony” in Swahili), a mobile-based plat-
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form developed to share information and create 
maps to report on postelection violence in Kenya 
in 2008. In the South African elections of 2009, 
political groups and their supporters used differ-
ent kinds of mobile software, combining instant 
messaging and chat functions to enhance com-
munication (SDG 10). Labor struggles in Africa 
have also adopted the Internet and especially the 
mobile phone, alongside traditional media, for 
purposes of mobilization, coordination, and sol-
idarity, for example the Marikana mine workers 
in South Africa (Walton 2014) and the El-Mahal-
la textile workers in Egypt. Section 5.4 discussed 
parallel developments in Northeast Asia.
Another important affordance of ICTs for social 
justice struggles is the ease with which they en-
able textual and multimedia commentary, pro-
test, and dissent (SDG 16). Building on the early 
history of dial-up Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) 
from the late 1980s to late 1990s (Goggin and 
McLelland 2016), the growth of the World Wide 
Web in the 1990s saw the emergence of blogs as 
a flexible and powerful architecture of connec-
tion and commentary (Bruns and Jacobs 2006). 
In many countries, blogs enabled writers and ac-
tivists, audiences and publics to engage and con-
nect. Although this first attracted attention in 
the United States, it quickly became influential 
among social movements elsewhere, for example 
in the Middle East, especially Egypt (el-Nawaway 
and Khamis 2015) and Iran (Sreberny and Khia-
bany 2010). Blogs provide a way for religious, 
cultural, political, and linguistic communities to 
connect across territorial boundaries around re-
ligion (the various Muslim blogospheres: Russell 
and Echchaibi 2009), gender rights (Guta and 
Karolak 2015), health issues, and diasporic and 
sexual identities.
But the implications of information and com-
munications technologies for achieving social 
justice and democracy are often ambiguous for 
several reasons. First, patterns of access and use 
remain very unequal. An example from the early 
2000s comes from two postapartheid South Af-
rican social movements, the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC) and the Anti-Privatization 
Forum (APF): although they used websites and 
email to disseminate information, they needed 
to limit their mobile phone use to communica-
tions within their organizations. The use more 
recently of smartphones to communicate elec-
tion messaging does not necessarily transform 
the public sphere overall or citizens’ opportuni-
ties within it (Walton and Donner 2009). The use 
of different media for different functions may 
channel politics and related activity into partic-
ular elite domains (policy discussion by experts, 
for instance), rather than broadly-based public 
spheres in which wider populations can partic-
ipate (Wasserman 2007).
Second, debate continues about the role of social 
media platforms in creating new forms of soli-
darity and transnational mobilization. Facebook 
has been associated with various social and po-
litical movements, especially the “Arab Spring” 
uprisings of 2011, as well as the recent “Women’s 
March” – a worldwide protest held in January 
2017 to protect legislation and policies regarding 
human rights and environmental issues. Mean-
while, Twitter - relatively simple in its design, 
and without the cross-media integration of Face-
book – has nonetheless helped incubate various 
initiatives based on “hashtag publics” (Weller et 
al. 2013), for example around Iran’s 2009 election 
(Mottahedeh 2015), #BlackLivesMatter in the 
United States and the #RhodesMustFall protests 
in South Africa.
At the same time, however, the infrastructure 
of social media and digital platforms remains 
tightly controlled by their corporate owners and 
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managers (Andrejevic 2013), rather than by ac-
tivists. Technological affordances that are key to 
solidarity – for example the hashtag function in 
Twitter – can be changed overnight by the parent 
corporation without consultation or participa-
tion of users. It remains very difficult for users 
or activists to have systematic input into the de-
sign and governance of commercial social media 
platforms (Mansell 2012). Social movements and 
social justice activists have learned that the po-
tential of digital platforms to enhance their com-
munication capabilities goes hand in hand with 
increased surveillance of their actions (Treré 
2015). Finally, it is important to remember that 
the very same communication resources that 
benefit movements for social justice and social 
progress are also benefiting the movements that 
oppose them. We need therefore in reviewing the 
potential of new media technologies to acknowl-
edge both affordances and constraints, and how 
they interact in specific contexts.
7.3 One planet, many struggles, many me-
dia
Contemporary protest movements tend to draw 
on an “enlarged media ecology” (Qiu 2008) of 
old and new media, where traditional commu-
nication channels are mixed with new digital 
tools of activism. A variety of media ecologies 
have proved important in the context of different 
struggles for social justice across the world.
The interplay among traditional and digital me-
dia reached new heights as the Arab uprisings of 
2010 and 2011 spawned a vibrant scene of dis-
sident media and culture. The rise of political 
stand-up comedy was a hallmark of the upris-
ing: in Bahrain, Syria, and Tunisia digital vid-
eos bore witness to atrocities, mocked dictators, 
and showcased a variety of animation, dance, 
theatre, and song. The media of artists and ac-
tivists, often produced and disseminated under 
extremely risky conditions, is an important form 
of “creative insurgency” (Kraidy 2016). Mean-
while, media-based activism for gender equality 
and the empowerment of all women and girls is 
also growing worldwide. Through creative media 
strategies, advocacy groups have from the 1990s 
onwards made remarkable progress in the realm 
of gender equality from universal suffrage for 
women to rights for sexual minorities.
As another example, in the struggle against ISIS, 
activists have been running clandestine festivals 
of short films, shot on mobile phones, thereby 
defying local political censorship and moral pro-
hibitions. The group “Raqqa is Being Slaughtered 
Silently” has documented the atrocities of daily 
life under the Islamic State, propagating these on 
social media and connecting with mainstream 
journalists worldwide.
As these examples also illustrate, care is needed 
to contextualize the role of digital platforms in 
social movements. Digital technologies and so-
cial media platforms rarely drive political actions 
and protest in themselves. Social movements’ 
communication strategies may involve not only 
digital technologies but also a wide range of 
nondigital media. In the 2013-2016 Gezi Square 
protests in Turkey, solidarity was built through a 
mix of media that combined photocopied zines 
and street performance with content shared via 
social media platforms (Saybaşılı 2014).
A significant new direction in media activism is 
as a space for political agency outside the sectar-
ianism that dominates mainstream media and 
politics in polarized societies. In Lebanon, ac-
tivists have mobilized around issues of environ-
mental justice and the provision of utilities; the 
2015 “You Stink” Movement, which used digital 
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media to mobilize activism about inadequate 
removal services for municipal waste, was a key 
example of this trend.
Anticorruption campaigning has also harnessed 
diverse media capabilities. The most dramatic ex-
ample of using the Internet as an infrastructure 
of connection to challenge not just corruption, 
but state and corporate power more generally, is 
the work of the activist group Anonymous with 
its “denial of service” and other attacks (Coleman 
2014) and the whistleblower platform WikiLeaks 
(Brevini, Hintz and McCurdy 2013). One of the 
largest civil society campaigns in recent years is 
the 2011 Indian anticorruption movement trig-
gered by Anna Hazare’s hunger strike in New 
Delhi.
In conclusion, all social justice and social prog-
ress initiatives depend on complex media ecol-
ogies that offer resources while simultaneously 
imposing risks and constraints. Activist individ-
uals and communities, not technologies, drive 
social progress, by meeting the specific commu-
nication and information needs of each social 
justice context.
7.4. Creative affordances: The case of dis-
ability movements
An excellent case study of the role that the new 
affordances of digital media technology can play 
is disability. According to the landmark WHO 
2011 World Report on Disability, more than one 
billion people in the world experience disability 
(15% of world’s population), of whom 110-190 
million experience very significant disabilities 
(SDG 3).
Disability involves a wide range of impairment 
types from sensory disabilities to cognitive dis-
abilities and psychosocial conditions. Prevalence 
of disability is growing due to population ageing 
and global increase in chronic health conditions. 
Disability is highly correlated with disadvantage 
but not “all people with disabilities are equally 
disadvantaged” (WHO 2011).
A roadmap for putting disability at the heart of 
the vision for social progress was proposed in 
2006 by the UN Convention on Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities (CRPD). The CRPD has 
many provisions, which involve communication 
and technology rights, since media is pivotal for 
achieving human rights in relation to disabili-
ty. People with disabilities generally experience 
inferior access to and affordability of media in-
frastructures, technologies, content, and partic-
ipation, especially in the Global South. At the 
same time, disability becomes a paradigm case 
for rethinking both media and media’s potential 
contribution to social progress. Disability is a 
key part of wider understandings of cultural and 
media diversity, but is of particular interest be-
cause of disability struggles’ strong focus on dig-
ital technologies and their affordances.
Since the 1970s, the role of media in communi-
cating negative attitudes, stereotypes and myths 
about disability has been critiqued, commencing 
with the role of advertising in “charity” discours-
es of disability and a push towards affirmative 
images of disability. Although still very much in 
the minority, people with disabilities appear as 
characters of TV shows, increasingly reported in 
news, or, on occasion, as media workers, broad-
casters, journalists, and celebrities themselves. 
However there remains a hierarchy of what is 
newsworthy, entertaining, and shareable, even in 
digital platforms. Mainstream media industries 
generally lag behind in offering work opportu-
nities to people with disabilities (SDG 8). Dis-
ability still occupies a marginal place on media 
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professionals’ agendas.
However, in various countries, people with dis-
abilities and their allies are using digital plat-
forms in distinctive ways: for example, U.S. Deaf 
protests in the Gaudallet “Deaf President” cam-
paign; the use of video, photography, and social 
media by Bolivian disability activists in March 
2016 to demand better social support (Goggin 
2016); and British disability movement protests 
from 2012 against welfare cuts, using blogs, Face-
book, and Twitter. Through social media, blogs, 
and websites a wide variety of disability publics 
have emerged. People with disabilities have also 
developed their own disability media: dedicated 
blogs (Ouch! established by BBC in U.K.), dis-
ability comedy-chatshow news genres (The Last 
Leg, Channel 4 in Britain), disability web-based 
programs (Gimpgirl), and crowd-funding plat-
forms used to fund investigative journalism or 
entertainment.
Issues of accessibility to media infrastructures, 
as well as the potential affordances of these plat-
forms, are particularly salient for people with 
disabilities, for example, captioning on TV and 
radio for the print handicapped. Despite their 
long histories, disability media such as Braille 
formats and sign language communication are 
still given little recognition in wider society, al-
though there have been concerted international 
efforts on some aspects of digital technology (ac-
cessible computers and software, web accessibil-
ity, mobile phone accessibility, “apps” for people 
with disabilities).
Yet even in areas with the most concentrated 
effort, such as web accessibility, the situation re-
mains inequitable: most government websites 
across the world have low levels of accessibility 
compliance, despite “digital first” government 
service, welfare, and e-government policies. The 
implementation of the CRPD requires wide-
spread accessibility, especially across design of 
digital technologies, but national legislatures and 
media corporations have been slow to act.
The lack of social progress on disability and me-
dia is a central issue for wider social progress. It 
constrains the possibilities for social and cultur-
al participation of people with disabilities (SPI 
“Health and wellness”). Yet disability has much 
to teach us about how communication occurs 
across the world’s population: communica-
tion among, with, and by people with disabili-
ties foregrounds issues of voice (Couldry 2010) 
and listening (MacNamara 2015): people with 
disabilities need access to public spheres where 
we can all listen not least governments, corpora-
tions, civil society, and a wide range of other or-
ganizations and agents (Goggin 2009). Without 
that the much-vaunted promises of new digital 
technologies are hollow.
58
8.1  – This chapter has told two stories. On the 
one hand, the vast and varied media landscape 
we have depicted offers a complex set of resourc-
es for daily life and social movements. On the 
other, this landscape is marked by processes of 
power both old and radically new: new power 
processes include an emerging logic of data ex-
traction tied to an imperative of data stimulation 
via increased message circulation (Sections 3 
and 6). Through this transformation, unfamiliar 
forms of domination and exclusion are emerg-
ing, while public discourse and practices of gov-
ernment are subject to surprising new pressures. 
The long history of communications, and specif-
ically media technologies, is now joining up with 
capitalism’s development in striking new ways. 
The resulting global information environment 
requires urgent attention, if our understanding 
of social progress’ dynamics is not to be danger-
ously oversimplified.
8.2 – Media are an important resource for move-
ments that promote social progress, and effective 
access to media is a necessary component of so-
cial justice (and a too-little recognized compo-
nent of social progress itself). By “effective access” 
we mean that all individuals and communities 
should be able to use media infrastructures to 
produce content, access information and knowl-
edge, and be active participants in the realms of 
politics, culture, and governance. Three major 
factors complicate the picture considerably.
First, the distribution of media resources (in-
cluding traditional media and digital platforms) 
is skewed towards the rich and powerful, and 
away from the majority of the world’s popula-
tion, especially poor, marginalized, and excluded 
groups. This basic fact is ignored by the recur-
rent “social imaginary” (Taylor 2003) that sees 
media infrastructures as automatically progres-
sive and socially transformative (for critique, see 
Herman, Hadlaw, and Swiss 2014; Mansell 2012; 
Mosco 2004). Although people rely on media 
platforms for connection and communication, 
they generally have very little influence over their 
design and pricing, or the conditions of access, 
use, or content production and distribution. Sec-
ond, there is not one single space of connection 
enabled by media, but many such spaces, and the 
relations between them are highly uneven: ques-
tions of language and culture, unequal influence 
over Internet governance, software localization 
and technical design, all make the Internet, in 
particular, a highly uneven playing field for di-
verse groups, especially cultural and linguistic 
minorities. Third, even with access and more 
even distribution of opportunities for effective 
use, it may not be solidarity and dialogue that 
are facilitated when people come together via 
media (online abuse is also on the rise): the In-
ternet’s capacity, in principle, to enable multiple 
producers of content is not therefore sufficient. 
A central issue remains: how to design and sus-
tain online spaces that encourage dialogue, free 
speech, respectful cultural exchange, and action 
for social progress? The governance of Internet 
infrastructures is crucial in all of this, but itself 
highly contested and uneven.
8.3 – In response to these challenges, we recom-
mend that the key measure of “social progress” 
in the global policy community (the SPI) be ad-
justed to recognize effective media access as a 
new core component of social progress:
8.3.1 – While it is important that the SPI un-
der “foundations of wellbeing” includes “access 
to information and communications” (defined 
in terms of numbers of Internet users, mobile 
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phone subscriptions, and a Press Freedom In-
dex), this is insufficient: additional measures 
are needed for the distribution of opportuni-
ties for effective access and use. Such measures 
would concern not only access to the tech-
nological means to receive information and 
content, but also to appropriate pertinent and 
affordable technologies. The design of media 
infrastructures and digital platforms needs to 
be pertinent to diverse language communities, 
individuals with different ability levels, learn-
ing styles, and financial resources.
8.3.2 – While it is important that the SPI under 
“Opportunity” includes “personal rights” and 
“tolerance and exclusion,” this is insufficient: 
communication rights must be added to the 
basket of personal rights, taking into account 
the direct relation between lack of participa-
tion and diversity in the design and governance 
of media infrastructures and lack of inclusion 
and tolerance at a more general cultural level.
8.3.3 – The right to privacy should also be add-
ed, including appropriate regulatory frame-
works to protect against surveillance and data 
extraction.
8.3.4 – In addition, references to “tolerance” 
elsewhere in the SPI need to be interpreted to 
include tolerance in the media (that is, the ab-
sence of hate speech against the LGBTIQ com-
munity, women and girls, ethnic minorities, 
etc.)
8.4 – In addition, we make the following broader 
recommendations:
8.4.1 – Media and communications infra-
structures should be regarded as a common 
good, in the same way as other infrastructures 
(roads, railways, etc.). The recent wave of pri-
vatization and concentration in the media and 
information industries should be reviewed by 
regulators for its effects on the quality of me-
dia, its diversity, and its ability to meet peo-
ple’s needs. The encouragement of subsidy and 
spaces for nonprofit media should become an 
essential component of struggles for social 
progress and social justice. If progress is to 
be made towards these wider goals, major ef-
forts are needed by civil society, governments, 
and international organizations to promote 
and sustain media that exist outside of market 
forces, and to secure noncommercial financial 
models for their existence (e.g., license fees).
8.4.2 – Internet governance should not be in 
the hands of organizations who make deci-
sions, implement policy, and design online 
architectures behind closed doors. Popular 
participation and transparency should be the 
guiding principles that frame Internet gover-
nance, policy, and regulatory frameworks.
8.4.3 – Equally, processes for the design of 
digital platforms and other means of accessing 
the Internet should recognize and effectively 
include representation from the full range of 
human communities.
8.4.4 – Media infrastructures need to work 
more effectively to facilitate the content cre-
ation by diverse communities. Access to me-
dia infrastructures as consumers, receivers or 
audiences of content and information is not 
enough; individuals and communities need 
access as content creators; issues of language, 
affordability, user competencies, and technol-
ogy design are fundamental.
8.4.5 – Core aspects of society such as health 
care, social services, and financial services will 
be increasingly provided over the Internet in 
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the future, access to digital systems needs to 
be equally distributed among populations, and 
such access should come free of commercial 
tracking and surveillance.
8.4.6 – With increased state and corporate sur-
veillance, censorship, and data gathering need 
to become the focus of extensive civic debate 
and regulatory attention.
8.4.7 – Sound, independent journalism, espe-
cially investigative journalism, is essential to 
democratic life. Citizens need curated, credi-
ble, verified, and contextualized information 
to be able to make reasonable decisions in 
political, cultural, and social arenas. Alterna-
tive forms of funding investigative journalism 
therefore need to compensate for the threat to 
the commercial newspaper business model.
8.4.8 – Serious attention is needed also to the 
impact on environmental sustainability of the 
waste generated by today’s communication de-
vices and the vast data-processing infrastruc-
ture that supports their use. This point has not 
emerged earlier in this chapter, but it is an un-
intended long-term side-effect of intensified 
connection through media (Maxwell and Mill-
er 2012).
8.5 – In all these and many other respects media 
and communications flows and infrastructures 
are not mere background to social struggles, but 
themselves a site of struggle. We must acknowl-
edge the overall lack of progress in media reform 
over the past forty years. Since 1980 when the 
NWICO’s MacBride Report was presented by 
UNESCO, numerous initiatives have attempt-
ed to reform media infrastructures, including 
the World Summit of the Information Society 
(WSIS), the Free Press movement in the United 
States, and the net neutrality and free software 
international movements. However interna-
tional organizations have not generally pursued 
such concerns. The international organizations 
responsible for proposing media policy (Inter-
national Telecommunication Union (ITU); the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN)) have limited their scope to 
technical matters discussed with little input from 
civil society or social movements. A renewed 
and more inclusive debate on media reform must 
be launched.
Action plan
1. To add effective media access (as defined in 
Section 8.2) as a new core component of social 
progress in the SPI, to “ensure affordable, reli-
able, sustainable, and effective access to com-
munication infrastructure,” while acknowledg-
ing the long-term environmental waste from 
IT devices and data processing infrastructures. 
This means positioning communication rights 
as central to official definitions of Social Prog-
ress. Communication rights include the right 
to be a content creator; the right to free expres-
sion; the right to knowledge and information; 
and the right to privacy.
2. To open a public discussion in which matters 
of inclusion, affordability, and diversity in me-
dia take center stage over markets and profit.
3. To pressure international and national regula-
tory bodies and policy-makers to design and 
implement processes for civil society partici-
pation in Internet and media infrastructures 
governance and policy. Media infrastructures 
should be governed by multistakeholder, 
transparent, and open bodies.
4. To pressure governments, the private sector, 
61
and universities to be accountable for design-
ing media platforms that are accessible to in-
put from diverse individuals and communities 
– especially marginalized communities such 
as communities of color, gender minorities, 
LGBTIQ communities, disabled communities, 
and communities in the Global South.
5. To push for media and Internet regulation 
that protects users from state and/or corporate 
surveillance and data extraction for control or 
marketing purposes.
6. To promote media and Internet regulatory re-
gimes that forbid any type of censorship or dis-
crimination based on disability, gender, sexual 
orientation, or political, religious, or ethnic af-
filiations.
7. To promote the notion that “access” also in-
cludes opportunities for content creation and 
not the mere technological access to platforms 
for media consumption. Media and informa-
tion literacy, technical competencies, linguistic 
diversity, and capacity building are fundamen-
tal elements of access.
8. To re-establish independent, sound journal-
ism as an essential element of democracy, and 
for this purpose to explore alternative funding 
models besides the commercial (innovative 
forms of public-private partnership, license 
fees, etc.).
9. To promote free access to software and free 
knowledge, as the commons of humankind.
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Toolkit36
36 Note: we have allocated the tasks in the toolkit matrix to the actor who should have the main responsibility for each 
task, however various tasks should be developed by multistakeholder bodies
Goals/Values Policy Makers
International 
Orgs
Corporate 
media and 
tech sector NGOs Citizens
Effective access 
to communication 
infrastructures
Develop regula-
tory regimes that 
guarantee afford-
ability, cultural 
inclusion, and lin-
guistic diversity of 
media and digital 
platforms
Develop regula-
tion that allocates 
a significant 
proportion of 
communication 
resources (fre-
quencies, budgets, 
R&D) to citizens’ 
media initiatives
Develop regulato-
ry systems to deal 
in environmen-
tally friendly way 
with waste from 
IT products and 
their use
Promote net neu-
trality in national 
regulations
Promote the 
notion that 
“Effective 
access to media 
infrastructures” 
includes using 
technologies 
to create and 
disseminate 
content
Monitor media 
and digital con-
tent for diversity, 
inclusivity, and 
access
Sanction corpo-
rate media and 
technology cor-
porations if they 
fail to comply
Produce toler-
ant, inclusive, 
and diverse me-
dia and digital 
content
Design media 
and digital plat-
forms that can 
be used by citi-
zens to produce 
and disseminate 
their own con-
tent
Adopt net neu-
trality
Promote and 
support citi-
zens’ media
Promote me-
dia production 
and software 
design pro-
grams in 
schools
Promote train-
ing in media 
and informa-
tion literacy 
and writing 
code
Develop and 
support cit-
izens’ media 
(produced by 
local com-
munities for 
local com-
munities)
Develop 
and support 
school media
Implement 
citizen-run 
media and 
information 
literacy pro-
grams
Demand 
tolerant, 
inclusive, 
and diverse 
media and 
digital con-
tent from the 
private and 
public media 
sectors
Defend net 
neutrality
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Transparency and 
accountability of 
media and digital 
platforms
Communication 
Rights:
* right to be a con-
tent creator
* right to free ex-
pression
* right to knowl-
edge and informa-
tion
* right to privacy
Incorporate 
transparency and 
accountability in 
international and 
national legisla-
tion/regulation on 
media and Inter-
net
Include commu-
nication rights 
as a fundamental 
human right in na-
tional legislations
Develop the nec-
essary regulatory 
frameworks for 
the implementa-
tion, regulation, 
and vigilance of 
communication 
rights
Organize mul-
tistakeholder in-
ternational and 
regional forums 
to discuss the 
future of media 
and digital plat-
forms
Include commu-
nication rights 
in SDGs, SPI, 
and any other 
similar global 
blueprint to 
assess progress, 
wellbeing, and 
sustainable de-
velopment
Help subsidize 
nonprofit media 
and digital plat-
forms
Review and 
adjust business 
models for 
consistency with 
communications 
rights
Advocate poli-
cies, regulations, 
and treaties 
that advance 
communication 
rights
Produce and 
disseminate con-
tent that informs 
audiences about 
communication 
rights
Mobilize 
civil society 
to participate 
in global and 
local discus-
sion about the 
future of me-
dia and digital 
platforms
Raise aware-
ness around 
communi-
cation rights 
among social 
justice orga-
nizations and 
social move-
ments
Demand 
inclusion and 
voice in glob-
al and local 
discussions 
about the fu-
ture of media 
and digital 
communica-
tion
Demand 
communi-
cation rights 
from national 
governments, 
the private 
sector and 
international 
organizations
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Participatory gov-
ernance of media 
infrastructures and 
digital platforms
Design media and 
digital platforms 
regulatory regimes 
that include effec-
tive civil society 
participation, 
and in particular 
participation by 
representatives of 
Indigenous people 
and people with 
disabilities
Establish a glob-
al international 
body responsible 
for monitoring 
and assessing 
access, inclusion, 
diversity, and 
communication 
rights in media 
infrastructures
Promote the 
notion that civil 
society input is 
essential in the 
governance of 
media and digi-
tal platforms
Implement 
educational 
programs for cit-
izens about me-
dia and Internet 
regulation and 
governance
Include civil 
society partic-
ipation in all 
aspects of media 
and Internet 
governance 
(e.g., ICANN, 
WAN-Ifra)
Promote the 
notion that 
civil society 
participation 
in media and 
Internet gover-
nance is a right
Implement 
media and 
Internet reg-
ulation and 
governance
Demand 
inclusion and 
voice in glob-
al and local 
discussions a 
Demand the 
opportunity 
to participate 
in media 
and Internet 
governance
Implement 
citizen-run 
educational 
programs 
about media 
and Internet 
regulation 
and gover-
nance
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Participation of 
civil society in the 
design of media 
infrastructures and 
digital platforms
Budget public 
funds for inclusive 
citizen-led re-
search and design 
of digital platforms 
and software, 
where “inclusive” 
means includ-
ing for example 
women and girls, 
indigenous com-
munities, disabled 
communities, and 
linguistic minori-
ties
Monitor and as-
sess the cultural 
appropriateness 
and inclusivity 
of media, digital 
platforms, and 
software for 
diverse commu-
nities
Promote inclu-
sive civil society 
participation 
and input in 
the research 
and design of 
communication 
technologies
Establish the 
necessary chan-
nels to incor-
porate inclusive 
citizen input 
into research 
and design of 
communication 
technologies, 
especially Indig-
enous commu-
nities, disabled 
communities, 
and linguistic 
minorities
Promote 
research and 
design of com-
munication 
technologies in 
schools
Promote de-
sign of com-
munication 
technologies 
and software 
driven by 
the needs of 
disadvantaged 
communities 
and specifical-
ly (a) women 
and girls (b) 
Indigenous 
peoples and 
(c) disabled 
people
Develop and 
fund initiatives 
for sharing 
knowledge, 
know-how, 
technical 
expertise, 
and content 
between 
disadvantaged 
communities
Implement 
inclusive citi-
zen-run, local 
initiatives of 
communica-
tion technol-
ogy research 
and design
Demand 
participation 
in corporate 
and public 
communica-
tion technol-
ogy research 
and design
Promote the 
use of open 
access soft-
ware
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Protection from 
surveillance and 
data extraction
Design and im-
plement regula-
tion that protects 
citizens from 
surveillance and 
data extraction by 
media and Inter-
net corporations, 
governments, and 
security organiza-
tions
Regulate the use 
of algorithms for 
marketing or sur-
veillance purposes
Promote mul-
tistakeholder 
regional and 
international fo-
rums to address 
surveillance and 
data extraction
Re-position civil 
society organi-
zations as key 
participants in 
regulating the 
consequences of 
surveillance and 
data extraction
Lead a public 
conversation 
about filtering 
and predictive 
algorithms
Review and 
adjust business 
models for 
consistency with 
rights of privacy 
and data protec-
tion
Advocate poli-
cies, regulations, 
and treaties that 
advance rights of 
privacy and data 
protection
Develop trans-
parent and 
accessible 
conventions 
for disclosing 
sponsorship, and 
describing the 
use of predictive 
algorithms
Promote a 
public conver-
sation on sur-
veillance and 
data extraction 
as threats to 
privacy
Expose un-
lawful govern-
ment surveil-
lance activities
Support the 
design and dis-
tribution of ad 
blockers and 
tracker visual-
ization tools
Demand 
the right to 
privacy and 
protection 
against data 
extraction by 
corporate or 
government 
entities
Demand 
transparency 
and account-
ability of data 
collection, 
filtering and 
the use of 
predictive 
algorithms
Media infrastruc-
tures and digital 
platforms free from 
censorship
Develop regula-
tory regimes that 
demand transpar-
ency and account-
ability of content 
filtering mecha-
nisms
Develop legisla-
tion that protects 
whistleblowers 
and investigative 
journalists
Include the social 
responsibility of 
media and digital 
platforms as a key 
element of inter-
national and na-
tional media and 
Internet legislation
Monitor the 
transparency of 
content filtering 
mechanisms 
used by corpo-
rate and govern-
ment media and 
digital platforms
Promote the 
need for inves-
tigative journal-
ism as an essen-
tial component 
of democratic 
life
Commit to 
supporting inde-
pendent inves-
tigative journal-
ism as the social 
responsibility of 
media and digi-
tal platforms
Fund civil so-
ciety initiatives 
to monitor and 
catalogue con-
tent removal 
in digital 
platforms and 
social media
Support 
independent 
investigative 
journalism 
initiatives (in 
universities, 
foundations, 
or govern-
ment-spon-
sored organi-
zations)
Demand 
access to 
knowledge 
and informa-
tion
Support 
investigative 
journalism as 
an essential 
element of 
democratic 
societies
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Linguistic 
diversity
Media and informa-
tion literacy
Implement poli-
cies that mandate 
subtitles and 
translation
Design regu-
latory regimes 
that mandate the 
production of 
media content 
and software for 
linguistic minori-
ties and disabled 
communities
Include Indig-
enous people 
and people with 
disabilities in the 
formulation of 
media and In-
ternet regulatory 
regimes
Promote the 
inclusion of media 
and information 
literacy as a core 
element in educa-
tional curricula
Coordinate and 
support local 
initiatives for 
linguistic diver-
sity
Enable global 
visibility of lin-
guistic diversity
In collaboration 
with NGOs, civil 
society, and cit-
izens’ media, im-
plement media 
and information 
literacy initia-
tives at the local 
level, especially 
targeting chil-
dren and youth, 
disabled com-
munities, ethnic 
minorities, and 
other vulnerable 
populations
Produce content 
in various lan-
guages, includ-
ing Indigenous 
languages
Design com-
munication 
technologies 
and software 
appropriate and 
accessible to 
diverse linguistic 
communities 
and disabled 
communities
Develop free 
and accessible 
media and infor-
mation literacy 
initiatives in 
collaboration 
with NGOs and 
citizens
Promote 
alliances and 
collaboration 
between media 
and digital 
communica-
tion NGOs 
and Indige-
nous NGOs 
and social 
movements
Mobilize 
civil society 
and social 
movements 
to demand 
linguistic plu-
rality in media 
infrastructures
Fund/ spon-
sor media 
and informa-
tion literacy 
initiatives 
developed by 
international 
orgs, NGOs, 
civil society 
and citizens’ 
media
Promote pub-
lic conversa-
tion about the 
improvement 
of media and 
information 
literacy
Demand me-
dia content 
available in 
local lan-
guages
Demand me-
dia content 
and digital 
platforms 
tailored to 
disabled 
communities
Develop local 
initiatives of 
media and 
information 
literacy –
linked e.g., 
to schools, 
universities, 
community 
organiza-
tions, and 
local citizens’ 
media
68
Human knowl-
edge as commons, 
instead of commod-
ities
Balance intellectu-
al property rights 
with notions of 
information and 
knowledge as 
the commons of 
humankind, and 
the value of com-
munication and 
dialogue
Pressure trade 
agreement 
negotiations to 
balance intel-
lectual property 
protections with 
the rights to free 
knowledge and 
information
Promote free 
culture and 
free/libre/open 
source software
Recognize the 
limits to propri-
etary claims over 
information, 
expression, and 
innovation
Acknowledge 
the impor-
tance for social 
progress of the 
availability of 
nonproprietary 
information, 
expression, and 
innovation
Advocate poli-
cies, regulations, 
and treaties that 
advance a global 
knowledge com-
mons
Pressure 
schools to 
embrace free/
libre/open 
source soft-
ware in the 
classroom
Demand 
access to 
knowledge 
and infor-
mation as a 
right, not a 
privilege
69
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